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DEFINING THE BUSINESS NECESSITY
DEFENSE TO THE DISPARATE IMPACT
CAUSE OF ACTION: FINDING THE
GOLDEN MEAN
ANDREW C. SPIROPOULOS*
In this Article, Professor Spiropoulos seeks to clarify the
burden placed on employers who use the business necessity defense
to justify their employment practices in "disparate impact" causes
of action under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1991.
Although the original 1964 version of Title VII did not provide for
a disparate impact cause of action, the Supreme Court held in
Griggs v. Duke Power Co. that Title VII authorized such claims.
Subsequent cases initially placed a heavy burden on employers
seeking to justify their business practices, but later cases shifted the
burden to plaintiffs. As a result of this pro-employer shift, civil
rights advocates went to Congress to secure legislation of the
earlier standards. After several compromises with the Bush
Administration, Congress enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1991,
legislating the disparate impact cause of action. Interestingly,
advocates of the strict standard and proponents of the more lenient
standard both claimed victory in the legislative struggle to define
the business necessity defense.
In this Article, Professor Spiropoulos endeavors to make
sense of the business necessity defense. After surveying Supreme
Court opinions, Professor Spiropoulos examines the Title VII
interpretation problems faced by advocates of both plaintiffs and
employers. He concludes that the case law itself offers the
solution: The Supreme Court has established different standards
for different types of jobs, giving employers less discretion in
hiring workers for jobs that require skills and qualities that can be
measured by scientific validation techniques, and providing more
discretion to employers in selecting employees for more complex
jobs requiring special skills and other qualities that cannot be
* Associate Professor of Law, Oklahoma City University School of Law. B.A.
Carleton College; M.A., J.D. University of Chicago. I am indebted to the Kerr Foundation
for supporting the research that led to this Article. I would also like to thank my
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measured empirically. Professor Spiropoulos concludes by
responding to potential criticisms of his solution.
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INTRODUCTION
The passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 (the "Act")' marked
a profound reform of the law of employment discrimination. Many
of the changes effected by the Act provided new remedies for harms
already covered by federal civil rights laws. For example, victims of
sex discrimination in employment now can sue for punitive damages
under federal civil rights law,2 when before only victims of racial
discrimination could do so.' In addition to these remedial provisions,
Congress reversed several of the Supreme Court's decisions
1. Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
2. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a)(1). These new remedies were also extended to plaintiffs
suing for disability discrimination. § 1981a(a)(2).
3. For remedial provisions pre-dating the Civil Rights Act of 1991, see 42 U.S.C. §
2000e-5(g) (1988 & Supp. 1993) and 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(3) (1988).
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interpreting Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII") 4
and reinstated earlier interpretations of the legislation.'
The most controversial "reinstatement" provisions of the Act
concern the "disparate impact" cause of action under Title VII.6 The
disparate impact cause of action empowers plaintiffs to challenge
employment practices based on their impact on the employment
prospects of groups protected by Title VII without regard to the
intentions of the employer.7  The entire range of policies and
practices of an employer may be challenged in a disparate impact
case, including policies governing employee benefits and criteria used
in selecting employees.' Thus, if the harmful effects of an
employment policy disproportionately fall on African-Americans or
women, an employer may be enjoined from using this policy even if
the employer never intended to harm the groups affected.
The original version of Title VII did not specifically provide for
the disparate impact cause of action.9 Despite strong evidence that
Congress intended to hold employers liable only for intentional
discrimination, the Supreme Court held, in the seminal 1971 case of
Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,'0 that Title VII authorized the disparate
impact cause of action."
4. Pub. L. No. 88-352, title VII, §§ 701 to 716, 78 Stat. 253 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 42 U.S.C). These decisions included: Lorance v. AT&T Technolo-
gies, 490 U.S. 900, 905 (1989) (requiring plaintiffs to file challenges to seniority systems at
the time of the institution of the schemes); Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755, 761-69 (1989)
(holding that white firefighters are not precluded from challenging employment decision);
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228,237-58 (1989) (reversing lower court's standard
of clear and convincing evidence and adopting a preponderance of the evidence standard
for gender discrimination); Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642,650-55 (1989)
(restructuring the burdens of pleading and proof of the disparate impact cause of action).
5. See Pub. L. No. 102-166, §§ 2, 3, 105 Stat. 1071, 1071 (noted at 42 U.S.C. § 1981
note (1994) (Findings and Purposes)).
6. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k) (1994).
7. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971).
8. See, e.g., Colby v. J.C. Penney Co., 926 F.2d 645 (7th Cir. 1991) (challenging
benefits); Davis v. City of Dallas, 777 F.2d 205 (5th Cir. 1985) (challenging employee
selection).
9. The original act appeared to prohibit only intentional discrimination. See 42
U.S.C. §8 2000e to 2000e-12 (1964).
10. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
11. 1& at 429-32; see RICHARD EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS 184-200 (1992). The
Griggs Court, in agreement with a legion of civil rights lawyers and commentators,
reasoned that the goal of equal opportunity for historically disadvantaged groups would
never be achieved by banning only intentional discrimination. See Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431;
see also Steven R. Greenberger, A Productivity Approach to Disparate Impact and the Civil
Rights Act of 1991, 72 OR. L. REv. 253, 259-69 (1993) (arguing that Griggs was correctly
decided). The legacy of hundreds of years of discrimination assured that even if
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The recognition that elimination of intentional discrimination
alone will not establish equal opportunity is founded in the understan-
ding that conscious, overt discrimination is not the only form of
discrimination. 2 Effective anti-discrimination legislation also must
address three subtler forms of discrimination. First, laws must address
pretextual discrimination, which occurs when those wishing to
discriminate against African-Americans and other disadvantaged
groups mask their discriminatory intent by instituting and applying
neutral job criteria that disproportionately disqualify these groups. 3
The second form of subtle discrimination is statistical discrimination
which occurs when employers who possess no discriminatory intent
nevertheless believe that the lingering effects of discrimination have
so affected the abilities of minority groups and women that being a
member of one these groups can serve as an efficient criteria for
selecting qualified employees.' Civil rights laws must also address
unconscious discrimination. Many remaining barriers to equal
opportunity are not the result of deliberate discrimination but instead
are the result of habits of mind instilled in majority groups over
hundreds of years. 5 Employers, for example, who do not want to
discriminate against African-Americans often unconsciously institute
job requirements that will disproportionately disqualify African-
Americans. 6
Disparate impact theory attacks these subtle forms of
discrimination by forcing employers to justify the maintenance of
practices that disproportionately affect particular groups. The goal of
the disparate impact cause of action is not to force employers to hire
unqualified individuals; rather, it is to require the employer to take a
hard look at its practices and make sure that the requirement is truly
intentional discrimination were eliminated, other, equally serious barriers to equal
opportunity would still exist. See Griggs, 401 U.S. at 430; Greenberger, supra at 256. For
example, if an employer were permitted to condition employment on possessing a
particular educational degree or passing a general ability test when the job in question
could be performed successfully by someone without that education or tested ability, the
years of discrimination against African-Americans in the provision of education would
needlessly continue to disqualify them from many jobs.
12. George Rutherglen, Disparate Impact Under Title VII: An Objective Theory of
Discrimination, 73 VA. L. REV. 1297, 1309-11 (1987).
13. Ie at 1309-10.
14. David A. Strauss, The Law and Economics of Racial Discrimination in
Employment! The Case for Numerical Standards, 79 GEO. L.J. 1619, 1622 (1991).




necessary for the performance of the job.' In this way, the
disparate impact cause of action will in theory both increase equal
opportunity in employment by striking down unnecessary barriers and
protect genuine employer prerogatives by preserving necessary
requirements.
In applying disparate impact theory, Griggs, particularly as
applied by the lower federal courts, originally placed a seemingly stiff
burden on employers seeking to justify their employment practices.
Employers carried the burden of proof of demonstrating the necessity
of their practices, with many courts holding that the employer had to
prove that these practices were strictly necessary or essential to the
operation of the enterprise. Under this standard, vely few employers
could show that their job requirements were absolutely essential to
the operation of their businesses." Therefore, many employers
chose to eliminate job requirements to guard against a disparate
impact cause of action.'
After the Griggs decision, however, employers who were
concerned that the disparate impact theory would force them to
restructure their enterprises entirely implored courts to place limits on
the cause of action. They argued that the burden of justifying their
employment practices imposed upon them by Griggs and its progeny
was so great that they were forced to use quotas in hiring in order to
avert any disparate impact litigation. Their years of labor finally bore
fruit in 1989 when a Supreme Court far more sympathetic to
employer concerns than the Griggs Court placed severe limits on the
disparate impact cause of action. Wards Cove Packing Co. v.
Atonio'" placed the burden on the plaintiffs to prove that employers'
employment practices were unnecessary and established a more
lenient standard of necessity for justifying these practices. Rather
than proving that their requirements were essential, employers under
17. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430-31 (1971).
18. This opportunity for employers to justify their practices is called the "business
necessity" defense. See, e.g., EEOC v. Roth Packing Co., 787 F.2d 318, 331-32 (8th Cir.),
cert denied, 479 U.S. 910 (1986); Jackson v. Seaboard Coast Line R.R., 678 F.2d 992, 1016
(11th Cir. 1982); James v. Stockham Valves & Fittings Co., 559 F.2d 310, 355 (5th Cir.
1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1034 (1978); Watkins v. Scott)Paper Co., 530 F.2d 1159, 1168
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 861 (1976).
19. See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, CASES AND MATERIALS
ON LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLIcY 68 (2d ed. 1995).
20. 490 U.S. 642 (1989).
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Wards Cove only had to show that their requirements significantly
served legitimate employment goals.21
The civil rights advocates who had proposed and nurtured the
disparate impact cause of action immediately went to Congress to
secure legislation reinstating the earlier, more rigorous standards.
While the Democratic majorities in Congress both in 1990 and 1991
were willing to pass strongly pro-plaintiff legislation, President George
Bush was not willing to sign such legislation because of his professed
concern that the Griggs standards led employers to impose quotas.
22
President Bush successfully vetoed the 1990 bill and was threatening
to veto the 1991 legislation when he reached a compromise with
Congress.' The Act, as we shall explore in depth, purports to
restore the law regarding business necessity to its state before Wards
Cove.
In response to the Act, advocates of the strict Griggs standards
and proponents of the more lenient Wards Cove standards both have
claimed victory in the legislative struggle over the meaning of the
business necessity defense.24 Needless to say, when diametrically
opposed camps can read a particular provision in their favor, that
provision must be ambiguous. Indeed, the Act is a classic
demonstration both of how difficult it is to determine the legislative
intent of a particular provision when different members of the
legislative majority voted for the statute for different reasons, and of
how Congress avoids the resolution of difficult questions by drafting
ambiguous statutes.
In this Article, I will endeavor to make sense of the Act's
interpretation of the business necessity defense. In Part I, I will first
survey the seven Supreme Court opinions, starting with Griggs and
ending with Wards Cove, which attempted to define the disparate
impact cause of action. This survey will demonstrate that the Court
articulated two very different versions of the business necessity
defense: a strict one that would be very difficult for employers to
meet, and a lenient one that would give employers more discretion.
I will then demonstrate that those who contend that the Act
establishes a strict business necessity defense and those who argue
21. See infra notes 129-45 and accompanying text.
22. Note, The Civil Rights Act of 1991: The Business Necessity Standard, 106 HARV.
L. REv. 896, 900 (1993); see infra notes 171-74 and accompanying text.
23. See Peter M. Leibold et al., Civil Rights Act of 1991: Race to the Finish-Civil
Rights, Quotas, and Disparate Impact in 1991, 45 RUTGERS L. REv. 1043, 1081 (1993);
infra notes 163-80 and accompanying text.
24. See infra notes 146-242 and accompanying text.
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that the Act enacted the more lenient business necessity defense both
have plausible arguments for their interpretations founded in two lines
of Supreme Court precedent. Finally, I will show that because
Congress built the conflicting Supreme Court doctrine into the
legislation, neither side can conclusively show that their interpretation
was embodied in the Act.
In Part II, I will demonstrate that the problem with the extreme
pro-plaintiff and the extreme pro-employer interpretations is that each
side wrongly seeks to impose one standard on all disparate impact
cases. The Supreme Court precedent that the Act directs courts to
consult applies a flexible standard of business necessity depending on
the job at issue, rather than embodying one uniform approach to all
disparate impact cases. Building on the foundation of this precedent,
I will demonstrate that the only way to fulfill both of the objectives
of Title VII-the removal of artificial barriers to employment and the
preservation of the legitimate prerogatives of the employer-is to
interpret the amended Title VII as establishing different standards for
different types of jobs. A more flexible standard of business necessity
should be applied to qualifications for positions that, because of their
difficulty, great responsibility, or special risks to the public, require
skills or intangible qualities that cannot be measured empirically. In
the vast majority of jobs where such qualifications are not necessary,
the stricter standards of necessity should apply. This is the best
possible interpretation because it most accurately explains the
Supreme Court's doctrine before Wards Cove and it most effectively
achieves the policy objectives of Title VII.
In conclusion, I will respond to potential criticisms of my
suggested solution to the problem of the business necessity defense.
The goal of this Article is to demonstrate that the only effective way
to dismantle barriers to advancement of disadvantaged groups and
maintain the support of a society that is unwilling to sacrifice the most
important interests of employers, is to restructure hiring for jobs that
do not require the exercise of discretion, while providing more, but
not total, leeway to employers in selecting employees for more
complex jobs. The enforcement of a strict standard for hiring most
workers will ensure actual, empirical gains for disadvantaged groups,
without causing the severe efficiency losses and workplace disruption
that would result from applying a strict standard to managerial or
safety-sensitive positions.
1996] 1485
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I. THE INTERPRETIVE PROBLEM
A. Background
Any lawyer who seeks to understand the business necessity
defense of the Act first must grapple with the Supreme Court
opinions articulating the nature and boundaries of that defense.
These cases evince the developing division on the Court concerning
the interpretation of the disparate impact cause of action. It appeared
that the Court resolved this division in Wards Cove Packing Co. v.
Atonio.' This resolution, however, was unacceptable to many in the
civil rights community, as well as to a majority of the members of
Congress.26 The legislature responded by passing the Civil Rights
Act of 1991.27 What the Act accomplished can be understood only
by comparing the standards Congress established to the standards
articulated in the various Court opinions.
The Supreme Court first recognized the disparate impact cause
of action in Griggs v. Duke Power Co.' A class of African-
American employees of the Duke Power Company alleged that two
of Duke Power's requirements for placement in the company's better
jobs-a high school diploma and a passing grade on a general
intelligence test-unjustifiably disqualified a disproportionate number
of African-Americans.29
The Court held that employers may use hiring criteria that have
a disparate impact on groups protected by Title VII only if the
employer can justify such criteria." The Court articulated this
burden of justification in several different ways. For example, the
Court first suggested that the employer must demonstrate that its job
requirements are "significantly related to successful job perfor-
mance."31 The Court later stated that the requirements simply must
25. 490 U.S. 642 (1989); see infra notes 129-45 and accompanying text.
26. See infra notes 144-62 and accompanying text.
27. Pub. L. No. 102-166,105 Stat. 1071-81 (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
28. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
29. Id at 427. The defendant's plant was organized in five departments: (1) labor,
(2) coal handling, (3) operations, (4) maintenance, and (5) laboratory and test. Id. Jobs
in the last four departments were more desirable than those in the labor department. Id.
The high school degree and intelligence tests were required for placement in the four
desirable departments. Id at 427-28. Transfer from labor and coal handling to the other
departments was contingent on passing the Wonderlic Personnel Test, a general
intelligence test, and the Bennett Mechanical Comprehension Test. Id. at 428.
30. ld at 431.
31. Id at 426.
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be "related to job performance."32  In rejecting the company's
justifications, the Court stated that neither the diploma nor the test
requirements were "shown to bear a demonstrable relationship to
successful performance of the jobs for which [they were] used.
33
The "touchstone" of this analysis is "business necessity:, 34  The
employer bears the burden of showing that the requirement at issue
has "a manifest relationship to the employment in question. 35 With
regard to employment tests, the Court concluded that Congress
proscribed giving these devices and mechanisms controlling force
"unless they are demonstrably a reasonable measure of job perfor-
mance."36  The Court thus reasoned that Duke Power's job re-
quirements were not justified by any business necessity.37 The
defendant in fact conceded that "the requirements were instituted on
the Company's judgment that they generally would improve the
overall quality of the work force., 38 The Court concluded that while
"[d]iplomas and tests are useful servants, ' 39 they could not be used to
exclude certain groups disproportionately when they did not measure
an applicant's ability to perform the job.'
By articulating different formulations of the standard, however,
the Court left lawyers and potential litigants unsure of the showing
required to make out a defense of business necessity. Did an
employer merely have to show that its requirements were "related"
to the job, or would it have to show that employee satisfaction of the
requirements is "necessary," meaning essential, to the operation of the
business? Was this strict interpretation of necessity required by the
injunction to prove that the requirements were "significantly" or
"demonstrably" related to successful job performance? Did the
emphasis on successful job performance mean that employers may
institute only requirements (assuming they had a disparate impact)
that are meant to test job performance, as opposed to other desirable
qualities, such as intelligence or honesty, that an employer might
desire?
32. Ld. at 431.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 432.
36. Id. at 436.
37. Id. at 431-32.
38. Id. at 431.
39. Id. at 433.
40. Id at 436.
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Intimately related to the question of what standard of business
necessity employers have to meet to justify their job requirements is
what kind of evidence employers need to submit to show that their
requirements meet the standard. The Court remarked that one of the
reasons the company's defense failed is that the diploma and test
requirements were adopted "without meaningful study of their
relationship to job-performance ability., 4' This statement, combined
with the Court's reliance on the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission's ("EEOC") Guidelines on Employment Selection
Procedures, 42 suggests that the Court intended to require employers
to submit empirical validation of their job requirements.
43
Four years after Griggs, the Court revisited these questions in
Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody.' In Albemarle Paper, a class of
African-American employees charged that the paper company's job
requirements disqualified African-Americans at a higher rate than
whites and that these requirements were not justified by any business
necessity.45 In defining the standard of business necessity, the Court
first quoted the language in Griggs that required an employer to show
41. d at 431.
42. ld. at 433-34, 433 n.9 (relying on 29 C.F.R. § 1607.4(c) (1971)). For a current
version of the EEOC Guidelines, see 29 C.F.R. § 1607 (1995). The Court made particular
reference to the portion of the Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures, 29 C.F.R.
§ 1607.1-.14 (1971) (current version at 29 C.F.R. § 1607.16F (1995)), which demanded that
employers using tests make available " 'data demonstrating that the test is predictive of
or significantly correlated with important elements of work behavior which comprise or
are relevant to the job or jobs for which candidates are being evaluated.' " Griggs, 401
U.S. at 433 n.9 (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1607A(c) (current version at 29 C.F.R. § 1607.16(F)
(1995))).
43. Unfortunately, the Court did not supply definite answers to these questions,
perhaps because it was aware of the serious consequences of the Griggs decision and
wished to see how the disparate impact cause of action would be treated by lower courts
and commentators. Instead, the Court left to others the job of defining the specifics of the
business necessity defense. See Greenberger, supra note 11, at 270-71 ("[T]he standard the
Court articulates varies ... sowing the seeds of a confusion which remains unresolved even
under the new Act.... Griggs, then, introduced the impact principle into fair employment
law, but also left its definition largely to the future."); see also Mack A. Player, Is Griggs
Dead? Reflecting (Fearfully) on Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 17 FLA. ST. U. L.
RFv. 1, 18 (1989) ("The Court in Griggs thus gave conflicting signals as to the meaning
of 'business necessity' and launched the concept of impact analysis into a sea of
ambiguity.").
44. 422 U.S. 405 (1975). The opinion also explicated the standards for awarding
backpay to successful Title VII plaintiffs. Id. at 413-25.
45. See iL at 408-09, 425. The company in Albemarle Paper, much as in Griggs, had
divided its operation into different lines of progression, some requiring more skills than
others. See id at 409. In order to be hired for or to transfer to the more skilled positions,
an applicant was required to have a high school diploma and pass two tests, the Revised
Beta Examination and the Wonderlic Personnel Test. Id at 410-11.
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that a requirement have" 'a manifest relationship to the employment
in question.' 1,46 The standard settled on in Albemarle Paper,
however, evinced by repeated statements by the Court, was that an
employer may meet its burden of justification by demonstrating that
its requirements were "job-related."'47 More important, however,
than the terms used to define the business necessity defense in
Albemarle Paper was the way in which the Court applied the "job-
relatedness" defense. Starting from the premise that "[t]he concept
of job-relatedness takes on meaning from the facts of the Griggs
case, ' the Court imposed a heavy burden of justification on
employers by refusing to permit employers to use tests that are not
empirically demonstrated to be significant measures of job perfor-
mance.49
The enormity of the burden placed on employers seeking to
provide empirical proof of job-relatedness, or, as it is called in the
literature, "validation,""0  of employment qualifications is
demonstrated by the Court's treatment of the company's attempt to
validate its requirements. For example, the company argued that it
should be permitted to require a minimum score on a general verbal
ability test because the increasing sophistication of its operations
called for employees with better verbal skills.5' Shortly before trial,
the employer attempted to validate the use of the tests by measuring
the test scores against supervisor ratings to prove the job-relatedness
of its testing.5 2 The Court rejected this attempt to prove business
necessity, relying as it did in Griggs, on the EEOC Guidelines on
46. Id. at 425 (quoting Griggs, 401 U.S. at 432).
47. See, e.g., id. at 411 ("Albemarle engaged an industrial psychologist to study the
'job-relatedness' of its testing program."); id at 425 ("If an employer does then meet the
burden of proving that its tests are 'job-related' [the complaining party may show] that
other tests... without a similarly undesirable racial effect, would also serve the employer's
legitimate interests .... "); id. at 425 ("In the present case, however, we are concerned
only with the question whether Albemarle has shown its tests to be job-related."); id. at
427 (referring to "[t]he question of job-relatedness").
48. Id. at 426.
49. Id. at 430-32. In contrast, the Court could have permitted tests measuring abilities,
such as verbal skills, that an employer might desire its employees to have, regardless of
their position.
50. The term "validation" is used most often when discussing the use of testing in
hiring or promotion. See, e.g., Elizabeth Bartholet, Application of Title VII to Jobs in High
Places, 95 HARV. L. REv. 945, 951-52 (1982). The federal government has promulgated
the Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures ("Guidelines"), 29 C.F.R.
§ 1607.1-.18 (1995), to give employers guidance as to what standards must be met in order
for the employers' job requirements to be considered sufficiently job-related.
51. See Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 427-28 (1975).
52. Id. at 429-30.
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employee selection.53 The Court found the employer's validation
study defective because it did not demonstrate that the employer's
tests predicted the possession of, or sufficiently correlated with, the
skills required for the particular jobs for which the applicants were
being tested. 4
Thus, given the opportunity to mold the disparate impact cause
of action established in Griggs, the Court in Albemarle Paper chose
to impose a heavy burden on employers seeking to justify their
business practices when these practices have a disparate impact on
disadvantaged groups.55 By closely scrutinizing the company's
validation study under the rigorous standards established by the
EEOC Guidelines, the Court signaled that employers would have to
undertake an expensive, difficult validation study in order to justify
employment practices with a disparate impact.5 6
In Washington v. Davis,5 7 decided a year after Albemarle Paper,
the Court seemed to back away from strict business necessity
standards. The case concerned allegations brought by unsuccessful
African-American applicants for employment in the District of
Columbia police department ("District")." The plaintiffs contended
53. I at 430-31.
54. See id at 431-36.
55. See Greenberger, supra note 11, at 273 (indicating that the Court imposed "a
rather exacting validation requirement" on the use of tests and required "a relatively high
level of justification from the employer"); Player, supra note 43, at 20 ("Albemarle Paper
thus construed 'business necessity' to require an extremely demanding level of proof: the
demonstration of a clear and unambiguous relationship between the selection device and
actual job performance."). The Court in Albemarle Paper also indicated, for the first time,
that even if the defendant meets its burden, the plaintiff should be given an opportunity
to show that "other tests or selection devices, without a similarly undesirable racial effect"
would serve the employer's interests. Albemarle Paper, 422 U.S. at 425.
56. In fact, Chief Justice Burger and Justice Blackmun, in concurring opinions,
expressed concern over the strict standards of validation announced by the majority. In
particular, they warned against strict adherence to the standards set forth in the
Guidelines. See id. at 449 (Blackmun, J., concurring in judgment); id. at 451-52 (Burger,
C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
57. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
58. 1d. at 232-33. The most important aspect of the case is its rejection of the
plaintiffs' claims that state actions that have a disparate impact against particular racial
groups, that cannot be justified by some standard of necessity, violate the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See id. at 238-48. This Article is concerned only
with the Court's treatment of Title VII.
While the plaintiffs in Washington did not file suit under Title VII, in adjudicating
their claim under the provision of the District of Columbia Code that enjoined any officer
or employee of the District from hiring on the basis of race, the trial court applied the
disparate impact standards of Title VII. Id. at 234 n.4, 249 n.15. After the court of
appeals reversed the grant of summary judgment for the defendants because it found the
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that the requirement that applicants pass a written personnel test,
"Test 21," disqualified African-American applicants at a higher rate
than white applicants and that use of this test could not be justified
by business necessity. 9 Test 21 was designed to measure verbal
ability, vocabulary, reading, and comprehension.60 The plaintiffs
maintained that this test was not validated for performance as a police
officer;61 indeed, the employer conceded that it was validated only
for performance in the police training program.62 The plaintiffs con-
tended that a demonstration that the test predicted or was sig-
nificantly correlated with performance in the police training program
was not sufficient to validate the test as a prerequisite to being hired
as a police officer.63
In affirming the district court's decision in favor of the employer,
the Court characterized the business necessity standard as a "job-
relatedness" test, citing Griggs and Albemarle Paper.64 In applying
this test, however, the Court seemed to apply a much more flexible
test than it had in Albemarle Paper. Rather than rigorously
scrutinizing each part of the Test 21 validation study conducted by the
employer, the Court was satisfied with the employer's arguments that
the test was helpful in hiring individuals who make good police
officers.
65
The terms used by the Court to describe the degree of business
necessity required to defend against a disparate impact cause of action
are significant because they demonstrate a flexibility missing in
plaintiffs had stated a constitutional claim, the Court held that the court of appeals erred
in failing to affirm the district court on both the constitutional and the statutory claims.
IL at 236, 248. The Court, although the statutory claims were not directly based on Title
VII, applied Title VII standards in reviewing the statutory claims. Id at 249.
59. Id at 235.
60. Id
61. Id. at 236.
62. The employer's validation study examined the relationship between performance
on Test 21 and performance in the police training program. Id. at 251-52 n.17.
63. Id at 249-50. "The [c]ourt of [a]ppeals reversed because the relationship between
Test 21 and training school success, if demonstrated at all, did not satisfy what it deemed
to be the crucial requirement of a direct relationship between performance on Test 21 and
performance on the policeman's job." Id.
64. Id. at 251.
65. Id. at 250-52. When discussing the difference between the discriminatory purpose
required to demonstrate a constitutional violation and the disparate impact cause of action,
the Court explained that the employer can meet its burden of justification by validating
his requirements "in any one of several ways, perhaps by ascertaining the minimum skill,
ability, or potential necessary for the position at issue and determining whether the
qualifying tests are appropriate for the selection of qualified applicants for the job in
question." Id. at 247 (emphasis added).
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Albemarle Paper.66 According to the Washington Court, there are
several ways to demonstrate business necessity.67 The Albemarle
Paper Court, however, relied strictly on the professional methods
authorized in the Guidelines.' The Washington Court stated that a
test shown to measure potential to do the job may pass scrutiny,
69
while the Albemarle Paper Court insisted that any test measure actual
job performance." The Washington Court also held that a test may
be validated if it is "appropriate" for the selection of qualified
applicants," but the Albemarle Paper Court appeared to require that
use of the test be "necessary," meaning essential, not helpful."
Washington, then, disrupted the development of the business
necessity defense begun in Albemarle Paper. Even though the case
did not directly concern Title VII, the Washington Court seemed to
state that the expensive and difficult requirement of validating all job
requirements by proving their relationship to actual job performance
will not be found in all cases. The Washington Court, without
providing any explanation, thus seemed to raise the possibility that
the Court would be flexible in interpreting the elements of the
business necessity defense.73 A flexible standard would provide an
66. This increased flexibility is best demonstrated by the Court's conclusions on the
validation of Test 21. The Court found that the police training course was advisable
because it informed the recruit about his job and its demands, while imparting "a modicum
of required skills." let at 250. Also, the Court thought it significant that "some minimum
verbal and communicative skill would be very useful, if not essential, to satisfactory
progress in the training regimen." Id. (emphasis added). The Court concluded that the
district court's findings that "Test 21 was directly related to the requirements of the police
training program and that a positive relationship between the test and training-course
performance was sufficient to validate the former, wholly aside from its possible
relationship to actual performance as a police officer," were not foreclosed by Griggs or
Albemarle Paper. Id. at 250-51. Indeed, the Court thought that the district court's flexible
view of these cases was a "much more sensible construction of the job-relatedness
requirement" than the strict standard demanded by the plaintiffs. Id. at 251. The
validation study demonstrating that Test 21 was directly related to the requirements of the
police training program, therefore, was sufficient to demonstrate business necessity.
67. Id. at 247 n.13.
68. See Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 430-31 (1975).
69. Washington, 426 U.S. at 247.
70. See Albemarle Paper, 422 U.S. at 431.
71. Washington, 426 U.S. at 247.
72. See Albemarle Paper, 426 U.S. at 431. This debate over whether, in a particular
context, the term "necessity" means "essential" or "appropriate" is similar to the debate
over the meaning of the Necessary and Proper Clause of the Constitution. See, e.g.,
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 323-26 (1819).
73. See Player, supra note 43, at 20 n.90. (commenting that the Court in Washington
"appeared" to relax the strict validation requirements of Albemarle Paper).
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employer an opportunity to argue for the propriety of a less rigorous
form of validation in its case.
The next year, however, the Court apparently dashed the hopes
of employers for a broader business necessity defense in Dothard v.
Rawlinson.4 In Dothard, the Alabama Board of Corrections denied
the plaintiff employment because she did not meet the minimum
weight requirement set by statute for the position.75 The plaintiff
sued under Title VII, contending that the employer's height and
weight requirements disproportionately disqualified women.76 The
employer contended that the height and weight requirements were
justified by business necessity because they were good measurements
for the requirement that a prison guard be strong.77
In considering whether the employer proved that the re-
quirements were "job-related," the Court stated that "a discriminatory
employment practice had to be shown to be necessary to safe and
efficient job performance to survive a Title VII challenge."78 Thus,
to pass muster under the "job-related" standard, the requirements
must be shown to be necessary for the safe and efficient performance
of the job of prison guard. The employer must demonstrate this
necessity by producing evidence "correlating the height and weight
requirements with the requisite amount of strength thought essential
to good job performance."79 The Court held that this evidence could
be produced by "adopting and validating a test for applicants that
measures strength directly."' Quoting Griggs, the Court concluded
that this test must " 'measure the person for the job and not the
person in the abstract.' ,81
This formulation of the business necessity test is closer to the
strict formulation articulated in Albemarle Paper than to the more
flexible test described in Washington.' First, the Dothard for-
74. 433 U.S. 321 (1977).
75. It at 323-24.
76. Id at 328-29. Rawlinson also claimed the employer's policies violated the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution. Id at 324.
77. Id at 331.
78. Id at 331, 332 n.14.
79. Id at 331 (emphasis added).
80. Id. at 332. Significantly, the Court cited the EEOC Guidelines in favor of this
proposition. Id. at 332 n.15 (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1607 (1976)). It should be noted, however,
that the Court also cited Washington in further support of its conclusion.
81. Id. at 332 (citations omitted).
82. Mack Player agrees that Dothard established a strict standard in which "necessary"
is defined as "essential." Player, supra note 43, at 21. In addition, Player argues that
Dothard strengthened the plaintiff's ability to prevail by showing lesser discriminatory
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mulation returned the emphasis to performance of the actual job,
rather than performance in a training regimen. Second, the Dothard
test required the employer to demonstrate that strength is an
essential, not just an appropriate, component of job performance.83
Finally, the Court indicated that the skill or attribute essential for safe
and efficient job performance, in this case, strength, must be
demonstrated by a scientifically validated test.84 Thus, in Dothard,
after the uncertainty created by Washington, the Court seemed finally
to settle the question of the rigor of the business necessity test in
favor of a test that would be difficult for employers to meet.
This resolution, however, came into question after the Court's
decision in New York City Transit Authority v. Beazer.85 This case
concerned a challenge to the New York Transit Authority's policy
against hiring anyone using methadone. The plaintiffs claimed that
the ban disproportionately disqualified particular racial groups in
violation of Title VII." While most of the Court's opinion reversing
the district court's decision in favor of the plaintiffs dealt with why the
plaintiffs did not make out a prima facie case of disparate impact, the
Court did articulate a definition of the disparate impact defense.
After explaining why the plaintiffs' statistical evidence was insufficient
to establish a prima facie case of disparate impact, the Court
remarked that "even if [the plaintiffs are] capable of establishing a
prima facie case of discrimination, it is assuredly rebutted by the
[Transit Authority's] demonstration that its narcotics rule (and the
rule's application to methadone users) is 'job-related.' "" After
alternatives in that if the plaintiff shows such alternatives, she would prevail without any
further inquiry into the employer's justification for the practice. Id. at 21.
83. But see Rosemary Alito, Disparate Impact Discrimination Under the 1991 Civil
Rights Act, 45 RUTGERS L. REV. 1011, 1031 (1993). Alito contends that Dothard does not
require absolute or compelling necessity because the Court, in describing the standard,
stated that the employer must prove only that the practice is essential to efficient job
performance, not job performance period. By using the word efficient, Alito argues, the
Court required employers to show only that the practice is reasonable, not indispensable.
Id. at 1031. Alito's interpretation, however, is excessively literal. As exemplified by the
various formulations of the business necessity standard articulated in Griggs, what matters
is not the exact words the Court uses to define the standard; what is crucial is the kind of
proof the Court requires for a successful business necessity defense. Thus, we know that
Dothard establishes the strict standard because it requires proof of scientific validation.
84. But see Greenberger, supra note 11, at 277. Greenberger contends that the
weakness of the state's business necessity defense in Dothard makes it difficult to be
certain of the Court's thinking regarding business necessity.
85. 440 U.S. 568 (1979).
86. Id. at 576-77.
87. Id at 587.
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rendering this conclusion, the Court defined the business necessity
defense in a footnote, stating that the district court correctly es-
tablished that the Transit Authority's "legitimate employment goals
of safety and efficiency require the exclusion" of methadone users."8
It is sufficient, the Court wrote, that these goals are "significantly
served by" a rule excluding methadone users; the rule need not be
"required." 9 The Court concluded that when the employer's job
requirement significantly serves a legitimate employment goal, the
standards established by Griggs and Albemarle Paper are met."
Despite the Court's purported reliance on the former cases, the
Beazer standard is not the same as the one developed in Griggs,
Albemarle Paper, and Dothard. Under the Beazer standard, the
employer's desires need only be legitimate and the qualification must
only significantly serve these goals.9 Under the standard developed
in Griggs, Albemarle Paper, and Dothard, the employer must
demonstrate that the trait desired in the employee is essential, not
simply legitimate or appropriate.92 The means for testing that trait
must not merely significantly serve that goal; rather, the test or the
requirement must be scientifically validated to test for that trait. This
need for scientific certainty forces the employer to demonstrate that
its requirements are absolutely necessary to the operation of the
business, rather than helpful or convenient. In contrast, Washington
and Beazer were more lenient; they allowed the employer to use a
qualification that has a disparate impact if it is a convenient tool for
serving legitimate employer goals.93 As of Beazer, the Court had not
yet directly confronted the conflict between these lines of doctrine,
much less resolved it.
The next case addressing the business necessity defense provided
strong evidence of how the Court would finally resolve its division.
In Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust,94 Clara Watson, an African-
American, brought two causes of action against her former employer.
First, she alleged that the bank intentionally discriminated against her
88. Id. at 587 n.31.
89. Id.
90. Id The Court also stated, contrary to Griggs, that the ultimate burden of proof
on the disparate impact cause of action remains with the plaintiff. Id
91. Id. at 592-93.
92. See supra notes 28-56, 74-84 and accompanying text.
93. See Greenberger, supra note 11, at 280; Player, supra note 43, at 22 ("[T]here was
certainly no showing of job-relatedness of the kind previously demanded in Griggs,
Albemarle Paper, and Dothard.").
94. 487 U.S. 977 (1988).
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because of her race when she did not receive several promotions for
which she had applied." Second, and more important for purposes
of this Article, she alleged that the employer's system for determining
promotions had a disparate impact against African-Americans. 6
Watson particularly objected to the employer's reliance on the
judgment of its supervisors, rather than developing precise, formal
criteria." Watson alleged that the use of a subjective or
discretionary system disproportionately disqualified African-
Americans.98
The employer argued that the Court should not allow disparate
impact challenges to subjective or discretionary employment practices
because the nature of disparate impact analysis would make it
impossible for employers to defend subjective hiring systems.99 The
employer attributed the difficulty of defending these systems to the
strict validation requirements articulated in Griggs and Albemarle
Paper, claiming that "[s]ome qualities-for example, common sense,
good judgment, originality, ambition, loyalty, and tact-cannot be
measured accurately through standardized testing techniques,"'"
and, therefore, that any employer who wishes to employ the devices
necessary to select employees with these qualities would be put in the
difficult position of either having to forgo the use of these devices or
risk Title VII suit.'' Because these qualities are so important to
employers, the employer argued, most employers will continue to use
subjective hiring practices. In making their decisions, however, they
will attempt to discourage any filing of a disparate impact suit by
using quotas in promotions and hiring to mask the disparate impact
of their hiring practices. 2 Thus, to avoid a disparate impact cause
95. Id at 982-83.
96. Id at 983-84.
97. Id at 982.
98. Id at 989.
99. Id
100. Id at 991.
101. Id at 992.
102. Id at 992-93. It should be noted that the Court, in Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S.
440 (1982), made clear that the ultimate absence of any numerical disparity between
classes of employees at a workplace does not insulate an employer from a disparate impact
challenge if an individual employment practice disproportionately affects a particular
group. Id. at 452-56. While the Court's disallowance of the "bottom line" defense
theoretically should discourage employers from using quotas to forestall disparate impact
causes of action, common sense dictates that employers who hire and promote
proportional numbers of all classes of potential plaintiffs will be a less tempting target for
suit than employers who do not. In Watson, the Court recognized this reality, remarking,
"[i]f quotas and preferential treatment become the only cost-effective means of avoiding
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of action, employers will be forced to employ the very devices that
Title VII states may not be required of employers.103 The employer
insisted that the only way to free employers from this impossible
dilemma is to prohibit disparate impact challenges against subjective
or discretionary employment systems.' 4
The Court did not agree, unanimously holding that in order to
preserve an effective disparate impact cause of action, plaintiffs must
be allowed to pursue challenges to subjective employment sys-
tems. 5 The Court reasoned that if the use of these systems in-
sulated employers from disparate impact causes of actions, many
employers would add a subjective component to their employment
practices in order to immunize themselves against disparate impact
suits.0 6 The Court concluded, "If we announced a rule that allowed
employers so easily to insulate themselves from liability under Griggs,
disparate impact analysis might effectively be abolished. ' 1°7
A plurality, however, was sympathetic to the employer's
concerns. These Justices, speaking through Justice O'Connor,
believed that while disparate impact challenges to subjective hiring
systems must be allowed, the extension of disparate impact analysis
to these cases warranted a reexamination of the structure of the cause
of action as a whole.'" In the course of this reexamination, the
plurality suggested that the solution to the problem of proving the
expensive litigation and potentially catastrophic liability, such measures will be widely
adopted." Watson, 487 U.S. at 993.
103. Watson, 487 U.S. at 992. The statute provides:
Nothing contained in [Title VII] shall be interpreted to require any employer...
to grant preferential treatment to any individual or to any group... on account
of an imbalance which may exist with respect to the total number ... or
percentage of persons of any race, color, religion, sex, or national origin
employed by any employer.., in comparison with the total number of persons
of such race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(j) (1988).
104. Watson, 487 U.S. at 989.
105. Id. at 989-90.
106. Id. An employer could, for example, add an interview requirement to an
otherwise objective process. Id.
107. Id at 990.
108. i. at 993-94 (plurality opinion). The plurality began with the premise that any
construction of the disparate impact cause of action and its accompanying business
necessity defense that required the employer to use quotas is incorrect. In short, Title VII
must be construed so employers are not presented with the Hobson's Choice between
foregoing the use of necessary business practices and imposing quotas. IaL at 992-93
(plurality opinion). The only way to prevent this dilemma from arising, the plurality held,
is to elucidate and enforce constraints on the use of the disparate impact cause of action.
I& at 993-94 (plurality opinion).
1996] 1497
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
necessity of subjective employment practices lay in articulating a more
lenient definition of business necessity than the one suggested in
Griggs.109
In defining the business necessity standard, the plurality began
with the familiar "job-relatedness" and "manifest relationship to the
employment in question" language first seen in Griggs."' Justice
O'Connor's interpretation of this language, however, revealed that the
plurality accepted the conception of the business necessity defense
articulated in Beazer and Washington, rather than the one set forth in
Griggs, Albemarle Paper, and Dothard."' The plurality stated that
once the plaintiff makes out a prima facie case of disparate impact,
the employer must produce "legitimate business reasons" for the
practice in question."' In defending its practices, the employer
should not be required to prove scientifically the necessity of its
practices through formal validation studies.' Indeed, the plurality
stated that formal validation is not even required when the practice
in question is a standardized or objective test." 4 All an employer
must do is demonstrate that its practice serves legitimate business
goals."5 Relying on Beazer and Washington, the plurality stated
that this lenient standard was supported by Court precedent."6
109. Id at 997-98 (plurality opinion).
110. Id at 997 (plurality opinion) (citing Griggs, 401 U.S. at 432).
111. The plurality first demonstrated its intent to reduce the burden on employers by
maintaining that, contrary to the common understanding of the lower courts, the ultimate
burden of proof of demonstrating whether or not an employment practice that produces
a disparate impact violates Title VII is on the plaintiff, not the employer. Id. at 997
(plurality opinion). Rather than treating the employer's burden as an affirmative defense,
the plurality treated it much like the burden of production in a disparate treatment cause
of action. In those actions, all the defendant must do in response to a plaintiffs prima
facie case is produce a reason for its action. The burden then shifts to the plaintiff to
disprove the reason and persuade the fact-finder that the employer is guilty of illegal
discrimination. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-04 (1973)
(describing elements of a disparate treatment cause of action); Texas Dep't of Community
Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254-56 (1981).
112. Watson, 487 U.S. at 998 (plurality opinion).
113. Id (plurality opinion).
114. Id (plurality opinion).
115. Id (plurality opinion).
116. Id at 998-99 (plurality opinion). The plurality contended that in order to prevail
the plaintiff must show that other devices would serve the employer's legitimate
interests-but without the disparate impact-once the defendant met its burden of
production. Id at 998 (plurality opinion). The suggested practices, however, must serve
these goals equally effectively, and if the plaintiffs alternative practices are more costly
or burdensome, the higher costs and increased burdens will be considered in determining
the effectiveness of the alternate practices. Id. (plurality opinion).
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The plurality concluded that when judging whether an employer's
practices are necessary, judges should keep in mind that in most cases
they are not competent to restructure the workplace." 7 Judges
should instead defer to an employer's designs for its workplace, unless
Congress mandates otherwise." 8 Plaintiffs must be forced to meet
these high standards of proof in order "to avoid giving employers
incentives to modify any normal and legitimate practices by
introducing quotas or preferential treatment. '"" 9
Thus, the plurality opinion leaves no doubt as to where the four
Justices stood on the question of whether to follow the Griggs/
Albemarle Paper/Dothard line of cases or the WashingtonlBeazer line;
they chose the latter." Dispensing with the need for formal
validation and rejecting the notion that the employers must demon-
strate an overriding need for the offending criteria, the plurality stated
that an employer may retain its employment practices if it can show
that they are "legitimate," meaning convenient or useful.'
How far the plurality's conclusions stray from the model of the
disparate impact cause of action articulated in Griggs, Albemarle
Paper, and Dothard is best understood by comparing the plurality
opinion to Justice Blackmun's separate concurrence. Joined by
Justices Brennan and Marshall, Blackmun first castigated the plurality
for constructing a new disparate impact framework that is "flatly
contradicted by our cases."" Then, combing the Court's previous
pronouncements for support, Blackmun demonstrated how each
component of the plurality's framework constituted a departure from
the one developed in previous cases.
Blackmun began by discussing which party should carry the
ultimate burden of proof in a disparate impact case. Citing Albemarle
This conception of the plaintiff's opportunity to present less burdensome alternatives
is very different than that, for example, presented in Dothard. In that case, the Court held
that the plaintiff would prevail if she showed the existence of any alternatives; if
alternatives exist, the defendant's practice cannot be necessary. Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433
U.S. 321, 329 (1977). But even if no alternatives existed, the plaintiff could still prevail if
the defendant failed to carry its burden of persuasion that its practices were necessary.
Id. In Watson, however, the plurality argued that the plaintiff, in order to prevail, must
submit evidence of alternative practices in order to meet its burden of showing the
insufficiency of the employer's business justification. Watson, 487 U.S. at 998 (plurality
opinion).
117. Watson, 487 U.S. at 999 (plurality opinion).
118. Id. (plurality opinion).
119. Id. (plurality opinion).
120. See Greenberger, supra note 11, at 285-86.
121. Watson, 487 U.S. at 999 (plurality opinion).
122. Id. at 1000-01 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
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Paper, Dothard, and Griggs, Blackmun asserted that the Court's cases
made it clear that "a plaintiff who successfully establishes [a] prima
facie case shifts the burden of proof, not production, to the defendant,
to establish that the employment practice in question is a business
necessity."'" Because the plaintiff "has [already] proved that the
employment practice has an improper effect; it is up to the employer
to prove that the discriminatory effect is justified." 24
After establishing the appropriate burden of proof Blackmun
explained the nature of the employer's burden. He emphasized that
establishing business necessity meant that the employer must show
that its requirements are literally necessary, concluding that "[t]o be
justified as a business necessity an employment criterion must bear
more than an indirect or minimal relationship to job perfor-
mance.""a  In support of this statement, Blackmun cited Dothard
for the proposition that job requirements must measure qualities that
are " 'essential to good job performance.' ""' Thus, if they are to
pass muster under Title VII, job requirements cannot simply measure
qualities that an employer would find convenient or useful in an
employee; they must instead "directly relate to a prospective
employee's ability to perform the job effectively."127  Given this
interpretation of Griggs and its progeny, Blackmun concluded that the
plurality's views "cannot be squared with our prior cases.""
Despite this conclusion by Justice Blackmun, it cannot be said
that the plurality was either following or acting contrary to the
Court's precedents. The Court, in fact, had charted two separate
123. Id. at 1001 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment)
(citations omitted).
124. Id. at 1004 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
125. Id. at 1005 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment)
(citations omitted).
126. Id- (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (citing
Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 331-32 (1977)).
127. Id. (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). Curiously,
Justice Blackmun later states that an employer will not be liable under Title VII if its
hiring process is "shown to be necessary to fulfill legitimate business requirements." Id.
at 1006 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). Allowing the
employer to retain job practices with a disparate impact for requirements that are only
legitimate, as opposed to essential, appears inconsistent with Blackmun's earlier, specific
defense of a strict definition of business necessity. Given the clarity of that earlier
discussion, it is possible that Justice Blackmun did not perceive that this choice of words
would cast doubt on his earlier conclusions. It is also possible that ambiguity in Justice
Blackmun's explanation of the business necessity standard resulted from the ambiguity of
the precedents themselves. See infra notes 230-52 and accompanying text.




courses for the disparate impact defense. In Watson, four Justices
selected one standard, while three of their colleagues, judging from
Blackmun's opinion, apparently selected the other. Only the failure
to secure the vote of a fifth Justice prevented the Court from firmly
establishing a single framework for the business necessity defense.
In Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio,29 however, the Watson
plurality secured that fifth vote and implemented the framework it
had outlined in Watson. In Wards Cove, employees of Alaska salmon
canneries filed a class action suit alleging that the employers' hiring
practices resulted in a workforce that was racially segregated.
30
The plaintiffs contended that this segregation made out a prima facie
case of disparate impact because it demonstrated that the employers'
practices harmed the job opportunities of racial minorities.'
3 '
The Court, in an opinion by Justice White, first concluded that
the plaintiffs had failed to establish their prima facie case at trial. 2
Because the case was going to be remanded, however, the Court
decided to settle, once and for all, the outstanding questions concern-
ing the business necessity defense.
3
The Court first held that employers need not show that their job
qualifications were justified by business necessity in the strictest
sense." The Court explained that while the employer may not
prove "[a] mere insubstantial justification" for its practice, "there is
no requirement that the challenged practice be 'essential' or 'indispe-
nsable' to the employer's business.... [The] dispositive issue is
whether a challenged practice significantly serves the legitimate
129. 490 U.S. 642 (1989).
130. Id. at 646-47. The higher paying, more skilled positions were held mostly by
whites, while the lower paid, more menial positions were occupied predominantly by
Filipinos and native Alaskans. Id. at 647.
131. Id. at 648. The plaintiffs sued under both the disparate treatment and disparate
impact theories of Title VII. Id. All the lower courts ruled in favor of the employers on
the disparate treatment claims. Id. at 649.
132. Id- at 655. The plaintiffs contended that the racial segregation in and of itself
constituted prima facie proof of disparate impact. Id. at 650-51. The Court rejected this
contention, holding that a disparate impact plaintiff must compare the racial composition
of the employers' workforce to that of the pool of potential applicants. Id at 650-55. The
Court also held that the plaintiffs did not make out their prima facie case because they
failed to demonstrate which of the employers' practices had caused the alleged disparate
impact. Id. at 656-58.
133. Id at 658 ("If, on remand, respondents meet the proof burdens outlined above,
and establish a prima facie case of disparate impact with respect to any of petitioners'
employment practices, the case will shift to any business justification petitioners offer for
their use of these practices.").
134. I& at 659.
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employment goals of the employer.""13 Agreeing with the Watson
plurality, the Court held that while an employer carries the burden of
producing evidence of a business justification, the ultimate burden of
proof remains with the plaintiff at all times."6
Consequently, if an employer attempts to meet its burden of
production by demonstrating that its practice significantly serves a
legitimate employment goal, a plaintiff may prevail in two ways.
First, the plaintiff can persuade the factfinder that the practice is not
justified by business necessity.1 17 Second, the plaintiff can persuade
the court that there are alternative employment practices that will be
equally effective in meeting the employer's legitimate goals that do
not produce a disparate impact."8 This alternative employment
practice stage of litigation, the Court held, is analogous to the pretext
stage of the disparate treatment cause of action in that a plaintiff can
demonstrate that the employer's contentions that it needs the
offending practices are untrue.3 9
In assessing whether the plaintiff's burden of persuasion has been
met, the Court stated that trial courts must engage in a "reasoned
review" of the employer's justification for the practice. They must
not, however, establish such a high burden of justification that the law
produces a "host of evils."' 14° The central evil the Court sought to
avoid, as had the plurality in Watson, was a construction of Title VII
that left the use of hiring quotas as "[t]he only practicable option" for
employers seeking to avoid liability. This result could not be allowed
because it was one that "Congress expressly rejected in drafting Title
VII.' 141 Courts should defer to the employer's business judgment,
"proceed[ing] with care before mandating that an employer must
adopt a plaintiffs alternative selection or hiring practice in response
to a Title VII suit."' 42
135. Id.
136. Id. at 659-60. In reaching this conclusion, the Court acknowledged that one could
read its previous decisions as having established a different rule. Id at 660. Rather than
conceding that it was establishing a new rule, the Court argued that those decisions should
have been read as articulating the rule propounded in Wards Cove. Id. at 660. With
regard to the other parts of the business necessity defense discussed in Wards Cove, the
Court did not even acknowledge that a reading of its previous cases could have led to
differing conclusions. See Player, supra note 43, at 3.
137. Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 660.
138. Id. at 660-61.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 659.
141. Id. at 652 (citations omitted).
142. Id. at 661.
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Both admirers and detractors of Wards Cove saw the decision as
the most significant development of the disparate impact cause of
action since its advent in Griggs.'4' The new framework permitted
employers to establish requirements that served their legitimate goals,
but were not precisely related to the particular job. Employers, thus,
would be encouraged to rely more on ability tests in order to recruit
higher caliber workers. Certainly, proponents of the Wards Cove
framework argued, recruiting an intelligent work force is a legitimate
employment goal; they celebrated this freedom of employers to
implement desirable, but not essential, employment practices.'
1
Opponents of Wards Cove contended that it is precisely this
effort to establish general hiring qualifications not firmly anchored in
the specific requirements of the position at issue that has raised
barriers to historically disadvantaged groups. These groups, because
of past injustices, have difficulty competing with other groups in
general measures of attainment. They may very well be able,
however, to do the job as well as anyone who has a more extensive
education or a better test score. 45
The opponents of Wards Cove, many of whom were located in
Congress, then moved to overturn the decision by statute, but met
fierce opposition from President Bush. After almost two years of
wrangling, however, a compromise was reached and the Civil Rights
Act of 1991 was signed into law. This Article will examine how the
different parties to the compromise understood the agreement they
reached.
143. Theodore Y. Blumoff & Harold S. Lewis, Jr., The Reagan Court and Title VII: A
Common Law Outlook on a Statutory Task, 69 N.C. L. REV. 1, 33-45 (1990); Pamela L.
Perry, Balancing Equal Employment Opportunities with Employers' Legitimate Discretion:
The Business Necessity Response to Disparate Impact Discrimination Under Title VII, 12
INDUS. REL. Li. 1, 23-29 (1990); Player, supra note 43, at 2 ("In the seventeen years
between Griggs and the Court's recent decision in Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, the
Court failed to define with any precision what it meant by 'business necessity.' Wards
Cove Packing provides that definition."); see also Philips S. Runkel, Note, The Civil Rights
Act of 1991: A Continuation of the Wards Cove Standard of Business Necessity?, 35 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 1177, 1186 (1994) (arguing that Wards Cove is "extremely important
with regard to the ability of minority employees to protect themselves in the workplace.").
144. See, eg., Paul Craig Roberts, Bipartisan Assault on Equality, WASH. TIMES, Nov.
2, 1989, at F4.
145. Paul Gerwitz, Discrimination Endgame: A Civil Rights Summer Primer, THE NEW
REPUBLIC, Aug. 12, 1991, at 18-23; Clarence Page, The Reagan Court Shows Its Colors,
CHI. TRiB., June 11, 1989, § 4, at 3; Herman Schwartz, Illogical Force, THE NATION, July
10, 1989, at 40.
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B. The Case for Strict Necessity
The primary opponents of Wards Cove were civil rights or-
ganizations who saw the decision as a step backward in the fight
against employment discrimination."6 These organizations were
determined to overturn the decision and write legislation that would
codify a narrow definition of the business necessity defense. They
believed that Griggs and its progeny required the employer to
demonstrate that any practice or qualification used for hiring,
promotion, or termination was, to use the specific terms rejected by
Wards Cove, "essential" or "indispensable" to actual performance of
the specific duties required by the job.147
In other words, the civil rights organizations believed that the
only legitimate interpretation of the disparate impact standard was the
strict standard established in Griggs, Albemarle Paper, and
Dothard.'4  Many lower courts supported them in this view,
interpreting Griggs as requiring a strict standard of business neces-
sity.49 Indeed, this implementation of a strict business necessity
standard was vital to reforming the employment practices of large
employers and, thus, crucial to providing employment opportunities
to previously excluded groups.5 ' Civil rights advocates, believing
that the strict standard was the norm, viewed the Watson plurality
opinion and Wards Cove as usurpations.
Certainly such a view was not without foundation. A reasonable
lawyer could argue that the discussions of business necessity in both
Washington and Beazer were dicta. Washington did not deal with a
146. For example, one leader in the attempt to persuade Congress to overturn Wards
Cove was the Leadership Conference on Civil Rights, a coalition of civil rights groups.
Note, supra note 22, at 900 n.32. Other civil rights groups that took prominent roles in the
debate included the following groups that filed amicus briefs in favor of the plaintiffs in
Wards Cove: the American Civil Liberties Union, the Lawyers' Committee for Civil
Rights, the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), and
the NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund.
147. Runkel, supra note 143, at 1185-86; Note, supra note 22, at 899-900.
148. Note, supra note 22, at 899-900; see also C. Boyden Gray, Disparate Impact:
History and Consequences, 54 LA. L. REv. 1487, 1491-93 (1994) (arguing that civil rights
activists viewed Wards Cove as a "disquieting trend" in Supreme Court decisions).
149. See, eg., EEOC v. Roth Packing Co., 787 F.2d 318,331-32 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
479 U.S. 910 (1986); Jackson v. Seaboard Coast Line R.R., 678 F.2d 992, 1016 (11th Cir.
1982); James v. Stockham Valves & Fittings Co., 559 F.2d 310, 355 (5th Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 1034 (1978); Watkins v. Scott Paper Co., 530 F.2d 1159, 1168 (5th Cir.),
cerA denied, 429 U.S. 861 (1976).
150. See ESKRIDGE & FRICKEY, supra note 19, at 68.
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Title VII claim at all.'' The Title VII claim in Beazer was resolved
by rejecting the plaintiff's prima facie case; the Court discussed the
business necessity defense only as an aside in a solitary footnote.152
Thus, proponents of a strict necessity defense can argue that because
Washington and Beazer were not considered discussions of the
business necessity defense, they should be ignored.
Stripping these two cases from the line of precedent makes
Watson and Wards Cove seem like a sharp break from a consistent
line of cases. This perception is, of course, exactly the one shared by
the civil rights community. The civil rights community perceived
Wards Cove as a conservative hijacking of the civil rights laws rather
than the Court's final resolution of a closely fought debate over the
real meaning of Griggs.15' Given this view, it is not surprising that
the civil rights groups turned to Congress to restore their view of the
law), .
The Democratic Party leadership in Congress gave these groups
a friendly reception. After months of consultations with the civil
rights groups, Senator Edward M. Kennedy, the chairman of the
Labor and Human Resources Committee, introduced the Civil Rights
Act of 1990 (the "1990 Act") to the Senate.'55 This bill, as it was
finally passed by Congress, stated that it was designed to "codify the
meaning of 'business necessity' as used in Griggs... and to overrule
the treatment of business necessity in Wards Cove."'56  The bill
stated that in order for an employer to prevail against a prima facie
case of disparate impact, it must demonstrate that the practice is
151. See supra notes 57-73 and accompanying text.
152. See New York City Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 587 n.31 (1979); Note,
supra note 22, at 908 n.83 ("[B]ecause Beazer is decided on other grounds and the job
necessity issue is dealt with in one sentence and part of a footnote, this dicta should not
carry much weight."); supra notes 85-93 and accompanying text; see also Greenberger,
supra note 11, at 281 (arguing that "caution is in order with respect to concluding that
Beazer fundamentally altered the first stage of an impact claim.").
153. Michael Carvin, Disparate Impact Claims Under the New Title VII, 68 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1153, 1155 (1993) ("The Wards Cove opinion led to some of the more
unbelievable rhetoric among the civil rights community that I have ever heard. The civil
rights community claimed that the Wards Cove opinion 'was a resurrection of Jim
Crow.' "); Gerwitz, supra note 145, at 23 ("[C]ivil rights advocates can no longer avoid
the political arena .... The entire current crisis was caused by a series of unfriendly civil
rights decisions by the Court.").
154. Indeed, the civil rights community sought to overturn not only Wards Cove, but
also several other Supreme Court decisions limiting the reach of Title VII. See
Greenberger, supra note 11, at 256 n.21. The civil rights organizations viewed these
decisions as an attempt by conservative Justices to revamp Title VII. Id. at 291-92.
155. S. 2104, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990); see Leibold et al., supra note 23, at 1056 n.66.
156. S. 2104, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. § 3(o)(3) (1990).
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"required by business necessity.', 1 7 The bill then provided a two
part definition of business necessity:
(o)(1) The term "required by business necessity" means-
(A) in the case of employment practices involving selection
such as tests, recruitment, evaluations, or requirements
of education, experience, knowledge, skill, ability, or
physical characteristics, or practices primarily related to
a measure of job performance, the practice or group of
practices must bear a significant relationship to suc-
cessful performance of the job; or
(B) in the case of other employment decisions, not involving
employment selection practices.., or that involve rules
relating to methadone, alcohol, or tobacco use, the
practice or group of practices must bear a significant
relationship to a manifest business objective of the
employer.' 8
After it had run the gauntlet of the legislative process, this bill
emerged in a form that appeared to satisfy the concerns of the civil
rights groups. The most important concern of the groups, restoring
the Griggs standard in the selection of employees, was accomplished
by the bill's language requiring the employer to prove that the
practice had a significant relationship to job performance."'
Proponents of this job performance standard intended that the
employer prove the necessity of its practices by scientifically validating
its practices in accordance with the EEOC Guidelines. For example,
the report of the Senate Committee on Labor and Human Resources
on the 1990 Act states that the EEOC Guidelines "embody the legal
principles that were accepted and applied prior to Wards Cove, and
which the Committee intends ... to restore."'" These legal prin-
ciples required employers to prove through scientific methods that
their requirements were necessary for successful job performance.'
6'
157. Id. § 4(k)(1).
158. Id. § 3(o)(1)(A), (B).
159. See id. § 3(o)(1)(A); Leibold et al., supra note 23, at 1071 ("[S]upporters of the
original 1990 legislation believed that employers should not be permitted to use practices
which effectively screen out minorities unless those practices exactly measure 'job perfor-
mance.' ").
160. S. REP. No. 315, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 42 (1990).
161. Thus, if an employer wants to hire employees with a high school diploma, he must
prove that a high school education is significantly related to successful performance of the
job in question by undertaking a validation study. Griggs v. Duke Power, Co., 401 U.S.
424,431 (1971). Under Wards Cove, the civil rights groups contended, the employer could
impose the requirement simply because he had the legitimate objective of raising the
educational level of his workforce. The education need not be necessary for the successful
1506 [Vol. 74
DISPARATE IMPACT
The requirement of such strong proof amounts to making employers
show that their requirements are essential or indispensable. 62
President Bush, on the other hand, was determined to preserve
an employer's freedom to use employment practices and impose job
qualifications that served legitimate purposes of the employer even if
those practices and qualifications were not strictly related to the
duties of the job itsel1 Indeed, the Bush Administration was
particularly interested in legislating a standard that would permit
employers to implement educational requirements for the same
reasons that were rejected in Griggs."6 The Administration argued
that employers should be allowed to hire more educated workers even
if the academic or analytical skills embodied in the earning of the
degree are not directly involved in the job in question, (e.g., an entry
level, labor job)." President Bush argued that employers will
impose these requirements whether or not these practices are
considered justified by business necessity." Echoing the arguments
in Wards Cove, the Administration argued that employers would
simply use quotas to make sure there is no disparate impact, thereby
resulting in exactly the kind of intentional discrimination everyone
wishes to prevent. 6
A group of "moderate" Senate Republicans who were habitual
supporters of strong civil rights legislation urged the President to
reach a compromise with the Democrats. 6' They played a leading
performance of the job. The civil rights groups insisted that restoration of the Griggs
standard was vital to the removal of arbitrary barriers to the employment of disadvantaged
groups. Gerwitz, supra note 145, at 19-20.
162. Indeed, at least some members of the Bush Administration believed the main
intention of the civil rights groups was the codification of the EEOC Guidelines. Gray,
supra note 148, at 1490-93. The Administration believed that the stringency of the
validation requirements advanced by the Guidelines would encourage employers to forego
the validation of their requirements and instead impose quotas. Id at 1491. Mr. Gray was
Counsel to the President of the United States during the negotiations concerning both the
1990 legislation and the final Act.
163. Runkel, supra note 143, at 1188-89.
164. Gray, supra note 148, at 1493 ("[T]he demands of global competition for a more
educated work force had, twenty years after Griggs, raised the stakes on the importance
of education to productivity.... Indeed, it was this argument over education that
constituted the core dispute between the Bush administration and the legislation's
supporters.").
165. Id at 1493-95.
166. Carvin, supra note 153, at 1155-56.
167. Note, supra note 22, at 900.
168. Leibold et al., supra note 23, at 1060-61. The following discussion of the
negotiations over the Act relies heavily on an account of the negotiations rendered by, in
their words, "counsel to three of the key Senate [Republicans], [who were] intimately
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role in the negotiations that led to the addition of the second part of
the definition of business necessity.169 This second definition
imposed a more lenient standard of justification on employment
practices that did not concern selection. The standard stated that the
employment practice is justified if it is significantly related to a
manifest business objective. Unlike selection practices, this standard
of justification did not require an employer to show that the practice
in question is related to successful performance of a particular job,
thus providing for the justification of a wider range of practices than
allowed by a strict Griggs standard.1
Despite these compromises, President Bush concluded that the
statute as written confined the business necessity defense to "an
unduly narrow definition of 'business necessity.' ,," The President
argued that this definition would drive employers to adopt quotas to
avoid liability because they could not defend their employment
practices.' 2 President Bush vetoed the bill,173 and the Senate, by
one vote, failed to override.74
The next year, the civil rights groups and the Democrats
remained determined to enact a civil rights bill. In fact, the first bill
introduced in the 1991 Congress was the Democratic leadership
proposal to overturn Wards Cove and the other offending Supreme
Court cases. 75 Hoping to build on the momentum gained the year
before, original H.R. 1, as did the 1990 Act, articulated two separate
definitions of business necessity, one for practices involving the
selection of employees and one for other practices. With regard to
involved in the negotiations surrounding" the Act. Id. at 1043. According to this account,
the Senators involved in the effort to persuade President Bush to sign civil rights
legislation were John C. Danforth (R-Mo.), Dave Durenberger (R-Mont.), James Jeffords
(R-Vt.), John H. Chafee (R-R.I.), Arlen Specter (R-Pa.), William S. Cohen (R-Me.), and
John Heinz (R-Pa.). Id. at 1043 n.2.
169. ESKRIDGE & FRICKEY, supra note 19, at 102.
170. Leibold et al., supra note 23, at 1074. For example, if an employer bans the use
of alcohol or drugs on the job and this practice has a disparate impact on a particular
group, the employer may justify this practice by showing that it is significantly related to
a manifest business objective, such as the prevention of accidents on the job. The
employer need not demonstrate that the prohibition of the use of these substances is
significantly related to successful performance of particular jobs, thereby giving the
employer more leeway to implement such practices.
171. Message to the Senate Returning Without Approval of the Civil Rights Act of
1990, 2 PUB. PAPERs 1437, 1438 (1990).
172. hi
173. Im at 1437.
174. See 136 CONG. REc. S16,589 (daily ed., Oct. 24, 1990).
175. H.R. 1, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1991).
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selection, the practice had to "bear a significant relationship to
successful performance of the job' ' 6 in order to be justified under
H.R. 1. Other practices had to "bear a significant relationship to a
significant objective of the employer. '
Needless to say, given that this proposal was almost identical to
the one vetoed the year before, President Bush immediately rejected
the bill's formulation of the business necessity standard. 78 The
"moderate" Republican group of Senators was also disappointed with
the efforts of the Democratic leadership.'79 Nevertheless, over the
next several months, these Senators were more determined than ever
to craft a bill that would be acceptable to themselves, the Democrats,
and the Administration.80 After the introduction of H.R. 1,
however, these Senators discovered that they and the Administration
fundamentally disagreed over the correct definition of the business
necessity defense.
The Republican Senators originally believed that they could craft
an acceptable compromise by building on the 1990 Act's distinction
between selection practices and other employment practices. 8' In
agreement with the Democrats, the Senators founded their position
on the principle that in order to establish business necessity an
employer should have to prove that his selection practices either
predict or are correlated with successful job performance.' They
believed, however, that if employers were permitted by Title VII to
justify non-selection practices such as drug or discipline policies under
a more lenient standard than the one they thought was established by
Griggs, the Bush Administration would agree that employer
176. Id. at 3.
177. Id.
178. Runkel, supra note 143, at 1188.
179. Leibold et al., supra note 23, at 1059-60.
180. Id. at 1060-61. The authors noted that:
Seven Republican Senators emerged dissatisfied from the 1990 debate on the
Civil Rights Bill. They believed that heated political rhetoric was damaging to
race relations, and clearly destructive of a civil rights consensus which would be
enacted into law .... Understanding the substantial division between the two
sides, the Senators sought solutions in these three areas which would not only be
acceptable to them, but also to the fiercest proponents and opponents of the 1990
bill.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
181. IM. at 1073.
182. I. at 1074 (indicating the Senators believed that "in 'selecting' employees,
employers should be permitted to use practices that disproportionately excluded minorities
or women only if such practices measured, predicted, or otherwise related to the re-
quirements for effective job performance").
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prerogatives were sufficiently protected. While they knew that the
President had vetoed a bill containing this exact kind of distinction
the year before, they believed that the President would agree to this
kind of compromise if they found the correct verbal formulation for
both business necessity definitions."8
In the course of negotiations over the business necessity
provisions, the Senators discovered that the Administration
vehemently disagreed with the strict necessity standard for selection
practices no matter how it was framed." The Senators crafted
several different versions of the selection standard, but the Ad-
ministration rejected every one because they all employed a job
performance standard.Y The Administration insisted that it would
only sign a bill that permitted employers to use selection practices
that served legitimate business objectives, even if these objectives did
not concern successful performance of the particular job in ques-
tion.8 6
In October 1991, following over nine months of negotiations, the
parties were at an impasse. The Senators were desperate to cobble
together a successful bill. According to political observers, they were
particularly anxious that the President sign a civil rights bill because
the media was portraying the Republican Party as an enemy of civil
rights in the recent wake of the Clarence Thomas nomination"8 and
the political success of former Ku Klux Klan member David Duke as
a Republican candidate for governor of Louisiana."
183. See id. at 1057-59, 1075-77.
184. For accounts of the negotiations, see iL at 1074-84; Neal Devins, Reagan Redux:
Civil Rights Under Bush, 68 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 955,990-99 (1993); Runkel, supra note
143, at 1193-1200.
185. See, e.g., S. 1208, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. § 5(a) (1991) (requiring employment
selection practices to bear a "manifest relationship to requirements for effective job
performance"); S. 1408, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. § 5(n)(1) (1991) (stating that employment
practices "that are used as job qualifications or used to measure the ability to perform the
job ... must bear a manifest relationship to the employment in question").
186. See Leibold et al., supra note 23, at 1077-78.
187. The controversy over allegations of sexual harassment against Supreme Court
nominee Clarence Thomas led some to question the Bush Administration's commitment
to civil rights. For an account of the controversy and its effect on the Act, see Pamela
Fessler et al., Rights Bill Rises From the Ashes of Senate's Thomas Fight, 49 CONG. Q.
WKLY. REP. 3124 (1991).
188. See Devins, supra note 184, at 996; Runkel, supra note 143, at 1999-1200; William




The Senators urged the President to sign Senate Bill 1745,"89
drafted by John Danforth of Missouri, the unofficial leader of the
group."9 This bill continued to distinguish selection practices and
other practices, but, in an attempt to persuade the President that he
could live with the business necessity standard established for
selection practices, the bill defined the business necessity defense in
language similar to that used in the Americans With Disabilities Act
("ADA"). 91 The Senators reasoned that the President surely could
not object to language similar to that contained in a bill he had signed
just the year before."9
As late as October 23, 1991, the Administration stated that the
Senators' proposal was unacceptable. 93 That day, however, two of
the Senators announced that they would vote to override a presiden-
tial veto of a civil rights bill they considered acceptable.94 On
October 24, the Republican Senators met with Administration
representatives and finally agreed to a compromise bill. 95
At first glance, the compromise embodied in the Act seems to
favor the proponents of a strict business necessity standard. Section
Three of the Act, which sets out the purposes of the legislation, states
that one of these purposes is "to codify the concepts of 'business
necessity' and 'job-related' enunciated by the Supreme Court in
Griggs" and in "the other Supreme Court decisions prior to Wards
Cove."'9 6 Thus, if an interpreter, following the civil rights groups,
reads out Washington and Beazer from the line of cases and dismisses
Watson because no one opinion on the business necessity issue
commanded a majority, she must conclude that the purpose of the
Act is to codify the business necessity standard articulated in Griggs,
Albemarle Paper, and Dothard.
The Act's definition of business necessity is contained in § 105(a),
which amended § 703 of the 1964 Act by adding a new subsection
(k)- 9' This new section states that an unlawful employment practice
189. S. 1745, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991).
190. For accounts of Danforth's role, see Devins, supra note 184, at 994-99; Runkel,
supra note 143, at 1193-1200.
191. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(6) (1994); Leibold et al., supra note 23, at 1078-79.
192. Leibold et al., supra note 23, at 1078-80.
193. Statement of Administration Policy on S 1745 October 23, 1991, Daily Lab. Rep.
(BNA) No. 206, at F-1 (Oct. 24, 1991).
194. Devins, supra note 184, at 996; Fessler et al., supra note 187, at 3124.
195. Leibold et al., supra note 23, at 1081.
196. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 3, 105 Stat. 1071, 1071 (noted at
42 U.S.C. § 1981 note (1994)).
197. Id. § 105(a) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2k (1994)).
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based on disparate impact is established if the plaintiff demonstrates
that the employer "uses a particular employment practice that causes
a disparate impact" and the employer "fails to demonstrate that the
challenged practice is job-related for the position in question and
consistent with business necessity."'198
This definition, which was the fruit of the last-ditch negotiation
session between the "moderate" Republican Senators and the
Administration, rejects the two-definition approach to business
necessity in favor of one standard for both selection and other
employment practices. The Republican Senators' idea of drawing the
Act's business necessity standard from the ADA did play an integral
role in the compromise. The Act's definition of the business necessity
defense, "job-related for the position in question and is consistent
with business necessity," was taken word for word from the ADA.199
Borrowing the language of another statute presents, it would
seem, an easy way to ascertain the meaning of the provision at issue.
If we can understand how those responsible for the enactment of the
ADA interpreted business necessity, we would then understand the
Act's definition.2° The Act unfortunately forecloses this easy path
to understanding. Section 105(b) provides that:
No statements other than the interpretive memorandum
appearing at Vol. 137 Congressional Record S 15276 (daily
ed. Oct. 25, 1991) shall be considered legislative history of,
or relied upon in any way as legislative history in construing
or applying, any provision of this Act that relates to Wards
Cove-Business necessity/cumulation/alternative business
practice.2 °'
The interpretive memorandum merely states that "[t]he terms
'business necessity' and 'job-related' are intended to reflect the
concepts enunciated by the Supreme Court in Griggs... and in the
other Supreme Court decisions prior to Wards Cove."'" In this
provision, then, Congress told the courts, the executive, and other
interpreters of the Act that they may not refer to extrinsic sources of
198. Id § 105(a) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k) (1994)) (emphasis added).
199. See Americans With Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(6) (1994).
200. At the time of the enactment of the Act, the ADA's employment provisions had
not yet become effective. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112 note (1994). Therefore, one could not
have, even in theory, turned to judicial interpretations of the ADA to assist in
understanding the Act.
201. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 105(b), 105 Stat. 1071,1075 (noted
at 42 U.S.C. § 1981 note (1994)).
202. 137 CONG. REC. S15,276 (daily ed. Oct. 25, 1991).
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interpretation other than the Supreme Court precedents prior to
.Wards Cove. Thus, Congress has precluded interpreters from relying
on the legislative history of the ADA in the search for the meaning
of the business necessity defense. Other than the conflicting Supreme
Court precedent, an interpreter of the Act is left with only the bare
language of the Act.
If one credits the account written by three of their aides, the
"moderate" Republicans believed that the Act's compromise
language, in conjunction with the purposes section, implements the
strict necessity standard for selection practices, at the very least.3
Certainly the Democratic leadership as well must have believed that
the Administration had conceded the fight on the business necessity
question. Otherwise, it is difficult to see why they would have agreed
to this compromise. Those who read the Act as establishing a strict
necessity standard emphasize that an employer who wishes to prove
that a practice is justified by business necessity must meet two
requirements.
First, the employer must demonstrate that the practice is "job-
related" for the position in question. 4 The proponents of a strict
business necessity standard argue that the term "job-related" is the
exact term used in Griggs and Albemarle Paper, both of which
interpreted the defense strictly.m In addition, because the practice
must be related to the position in question, the Act should be read as
establishing a job performance standard, requiring the employer to
prove that the practice either predicts or is correlated with successful
performance of the particular job at issue. The employer, as required
by Griggs, Albemarle Paper, and Dothard, must prove this relation-
ship by scientifically validating its requirements in accordance with the
Guidelines.
203. Leibold et al., supra note 23, at 1081 ("This compromise accomplished the
Republican sponsors' original goals because the agreed upon standard, borrowed from the
ADA, codified the flexible 'job-related' standard of Griggs."). According to the account
written by three of their aides, the "moderate" Republican Senators believed that, despite
being phrased as a single standard, the Act essentially enacted the two definition standard
they advocated all along. See id. at 1081-84. They intended that the first part of the
business necessity standard, "job-related for the position in question," would establish a
job performance standard for selection standards, while the second part of the standard,
"consistent with business necessity," would be defined similarly to the Court's definition
in Wards Cove. Id at 1082-83. Thus, if a practice did not concern particular positions
because it did not deal with selection, it could be justified if it served a legitimate
employment interest. See id.
204. lId. at 1082.
205. See id.
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Second, in addition to the "job-related" requirement, the
employer must demonstrate that the practice is "consistent with
business necessity."''  Supporters of a strict business necessity
standard both for selection and for other employment practices can
thus argue that it is not sufficient that the employer's practice is
related to the job in question; it also must be necessary. Many
employment requirements are related to the job, but they are not all
necessary. The use of the word "necessity" suggests that the practice
must be more than related or convenient; it should be required or
essential for the accomplishment of the goals of the employer. Use
of the word "necessity" must mean that Congress rejected a standard
that would allow an employer to impose requirements that merely
served legitimate employment goals. Taken together, then, the "job-
related" and "business necessity" requirement impose a job perfor-
mance standard, rather than a legitimate interest standard, and
require that the employer's practice be essential for determining job
performance, rather than just serving an employment goal.
Perhaps the most powerful argument in favor of finding that the
Act establishes a strict necessity standard is the Act's clear rejection
of Wards Cove. The entire motivation for the introduction and
passage of the Act was the majority of Congress's disapproval of the
rules laid down in Wards Cove and the other Supreme Court decisions
overturned or modified by the Act. This opposition to the Wards
Cove standard is expressed in the Act itself. For example, Section
Two of the Act states that "the decision of the Supreme Court in
Wards Cove... has weakened the scope and effectiveness of Federal
civil rights protections ... [and] legislation is necessary to provide
additional protections against unlawful discrimination in
employment."'  Section Three of the Act makes clear that the
legislation is intended to codify the concept of "business necessity"
enunciated in Griggs and all cases prior to Wards Cove,' thus
explicitly rejecting the understanding of business necessity articulated
in Wards Cove.
The extent of Congress's disapproval of Wards Cove can be most
clearly understood by examining the substantive changes effected by
the Act. As one commentator has noted, the very fact that Congress
decided to codify the disparate impact cause of action as distinct from
4,
206. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 105(a), 105 Stat. 1071, 1075
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(K) (1994)).
207. Id § 2, 105 Stat. 1071, 1071 (noted at 42 U.S.C. § 1981 note (1994)).
208. d § 3 (noted at 42 U.S.C. § 1981 note (1994)).
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the intentional discrimination action demonstrates the legislature's flat
rejection of the Supreme Court's attempt in Watson and Wards Cove
to redefine the disparate impact cause of action using the intentional
discrimination action as a model.2 9 This deliberate rejection of the
merger of the intentional discrimination and the disparate impact lines
of analysis was accomplished by making the business necessity defense
an affirmative defense, rather than a mere burden of production.210
Therefore, unlike in an intentional discrimination case, the employer
bears the burden of persuading the fact finder that it is not guilty of
discrimination once the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case. The
imposition of this burden of persuasion is precisely the factor that the
Wards Cove Court believed led to the danger of quotas and motivated
it to reform the law governing the disparate impact cause of ac-
tion.2
1'
If the Act so clearly rejects the Wards Cove standard and codifies
the strict necessity approach, why would the Bush Administration
agree to the compromise? Proponents of the strict necessity standard
proffer a simple explanation: The Administration, facing a veto
override, accepted the Act in order to save face.2  Put more
bluntly, the Administration caved in under the pressure applied by the
Republican Senators and by criticism in the media over the Thomas
and Duke debacles.213 Indeed, even conservative commentators
accused the Administration of capitulating to its opponents."1 4
In sum, a strong argument can be made that Griggs, in its
strictest form, is again the law. This means, say the proponents of the
209. Note, supra note 22, at 913.
210. The Act's provision that an employer will be found liable for discrimination under
the disparate impact theory if it "fails to demonstrate" the required level of business
necessity overruled this particular aspect of Wards Cove. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i)
(1994). The Act states that the "term 'demonstrates' means meets the burden of
production and persuasion." Id § 2000e(m) (1994).
211. For a discussion of the Wards Cove decision, see supra notes 129-45 and
accompanying text.
212. Devins, supra note 184, at 996 ("With fears of his coalition collapsing, Bush was
compelled to strike a deal with bill supporters.").
213. Id at 996 ("Given Bush's erratic track record on civil rights and his apparent
desire to place political popularity ahead of a principled vision, it is not inappropriate to
conclude that the October 24 compromise was a political capitulation."). Civil rights
supporters advanced these arguments in the press at the time of the passage of the Act.
See, e.g., William T. Coleman, Jr. & Vernon E. Jordan, Jr., How the Civil Rights Bill Was
Really Passed, WASH. POST, Nov. 18, 1991, at A21.
214. See, e.g., L. Gordon Crovitz, Bush's Quota Bill: (Dubious) Politics Trumps Legal
Principle, WALL ST. J., Oct. 30, 1991, at A17; Chester E. Finn, Jr., Quotas and the Bush
Administration, COMMENTARY, Nov. 1991, at 17, 23.
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Act, that employers must prove that their job practices and
qualifications either predict or are significantly correlated with actual
job performance.
C. The Case for the Wards Cove Standard
At the time of the passage of the Act, the Bush Administration
insisted that it forced its opponents to compromise on the Ad-
ministration's terms."5 Since the Act's enactment, those responsible
for negotiating for the Administration have advanced an
interpretation of the Act that demonstrates that Congress actually
adopted the Wards Cove standard.1 6
Proponents of a more lenient business necessity standard argue
that the fatal flaw of the civil rights proponents' argument is their
contention that Wards Cove was a sudden break with precedent.
217
This view, Wards Cove proponents argue, ignores the true nature of
the doctrinal development since Griggs. Wards Cove was not a
conservative hijacking of civil rights law; rather it was the natural
result of the Court's continuing attempt over many years to construct
a workable structure for the disparate impact cause of action.218 In
order to accept the civil rights groups' view of the precedent, one
must ignore Washington, Beazer, and Watson, half of the six court
cases elucidating the disparate impact cause of action before Wards
Cove. The importance of these cases lies not only in their number,
but in their specific factual background. Griggs and Albemarle Paper
both involved unvalidated, or insufficiently validated, objective ability
tests and educational requirements for entry-level positions. Thus,
they presented straightforward applications of the disparate impact
cause of action and the business necessity defense: If one wants to
use objective standards, one must prove that they are related to the
job. Beazer and Watson, in contrast, presented difficult cases. The
former involved a requirement that employees be drug free, and the
215. C. Boyden Gray, Civil Rights: We Won, They Capitulated, WAsH. PosT, Nov. 14,
1991, at A23.
216. For an argument in the press, see id. at A23. For law review articles, see Carvin,
supra note 153 passim; Gray, supra note 148 passim. Gray, as Counsel to the President,
and Carvin, as a member of the Civil Rights Division of the Bush Department of Justice,
were deeply involved in the negotiations over the Act.
217. See Gray, supra note 148, at 1489.
218. See Carvin, supra note 153, at 1161. Carvin stated that "[o]pponents of the Act
... argued that Title VII case law, in particular New York Transit Auth. v. Beazer, Watson
v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, and Washington v. Davis, simply required that a selection
device bear a demonstrable relationship to job performance or some business purpose and
that Wards Cove merely adopted and applied this well established principle." Id.
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latter involved subjective employment standards. As with the
development of any legal doctrine, it is the difficult cases, the ones at
the margin, that are most helpful in correctly articulating the
boundaries of the cause of action at issue. Therefore, Washington and
Beazer are not anomalies to be discarded; they are the direct
precursors to Watson and Wards Cove.
Both President Bush and many of the Republicans in Congress
who supported the final version of the bill explicitly relied upon this
interpretation of Supreme Court doctrine when they supported the
final bill. For example, in the statement he made upon his signing of
the bill, President Bush remarked that
the law of disparate impact has been developed by the
Supreme Court in a series of cases stretching from the
Griggs decision in 1971 to the Watson and Wards Cove
decisions in 1988 and 1989. Opinions by Justices Sandra
Day O'Connor and Byron White have explained the
safeguards against quotas and preferential treatment that
have been included in the jurisprudence of disparate
impact.
219
The executive branch's interpretation of these decisions, the President
declared, was embodied in an interpretive memorandum submitted by
Senate Minority Leader Robert Dole, on behalf of himself and several
other Republican Senators. This memorandum, President Bush
stated, "will be treated as authoritative interpretive guidance by all
officials in the executive branch with respect to the law of disparate
impact. '
The memorandum sets forth an interpretation of both the
Supreme Court's disparate impact decisions since Griggs and the Act's
effect on disparate impact law that relies squarely on the view that the
Wards Cove standard was the natural culmination of the Court's
treatment of disparate impact. Regarding the concept of business
necessity, the memorandum avers that the Act "embodies longstand-
ing concepts of job-relatedness and business necessity and rejects
proposed innovations. In short, it represents an affirmation of
existing law, including Wards Cove."'
219. President Bush's Statement On Signing the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Daily Lab.
Rep. (BNA) No. 226, at D-1 (Nov. 22, 1991).
220. ILd.
221. 137 CONG. REC. S15474 (daily ed. Oct. 30, 1991) (emphasis added).
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The existing law relied upon by the memorandum includes, not
surprisingly, Washington, Beazer, and the plurality opinion in
Watson.' Senator Dole and the Bush Administration argued that
in those cases the Supreme Court held that a job practice or
qualification was job-related and required by business necessity if it
served "any legitimate purpose, even those that may not be strictly
required for the actual day-to-day activities of an entry level job....
This is a flexible concept that encompasses more than actual
performance of actual work activities or behavior important to the
job."'  Thus, the Administration argued, on this specific issue,
Wards Cove is still the law; an employer can justify a practice that has
a disparate impact if it serves some valid business purpose. The
practice need not be essential or indispensable to the actual perfor-
mance of the job. 4
Is this argument tenable? Possibly not, if one considers the clear
intent of an overwhelming majority of Congress, including many
Republicans, to overturn the Wards Cove standard and codify a strict
necessity standard, especially as to job selection. However, in a
provision insisted upon by the Administration, the Act specifically
precludes courts from inquiring into this kind of intent. As we have
seen, section 105(b) of the Act states that the only valid legislative
history for the disparate impact provisions is the interpretive
memorandum inserted into the Congressional Record on October 25,
1991.21 This memorandum confirms what is already stated in the
Act. The relevant terms " 'business necessity' and 'job-related' are
intended to reflect the concepts enunciated by the Supreme Court in
Griggs" and "in the other Supreme Court decisions prior to Wards
Cove." This memorandum thus tells interpreters of the Act to
turn to the very cases the Republicans argue established the Wards
Cove standard. The Republican argument seems at least as viable as
that of the Democrats.
In addition to their argument from precedent, supporters of a
lenient business necessity standard argue that the Act's definition of
the standard-"job-related for the position in question and consistent
with business necessity"-supports their interpretation.2' The use
222. Id. at S15474-76.
223. Id. at S15476.
224. Md
225. Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 105(b), 105 Stat. 1071, 1075 (noted at 42 U.S.C. § 1981 note
(1994)); see supra notes 220-21 and accompanying text; Gray, supra note 148, at 1495.
226. 137 CONG. REc. S15474 (daily ed. Oct. 30, 1991).
227. Carvin, supra note 153, at 1157-60; Gray, supra note 148, at 1495-98.
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of the term "job-related for the position in question," for example,
suggests that the practice at issue need merely be related to the job,
rather than requiring that it measure job performance." Compare
the use of the term "job-related," the lenient standard proponents
argue, to the language used in the vetoed 1990 Act or the language
of the Act originally advanced by the Democrats.O9 For example,
amended H.R. 1, the version of the Act first passed by the House,
mandated that a practice required by business necessity "bear a
significant and manifest relationship to the requirements for effective
job performance."" 0  This standard specifically referred to job
performance, as did all the standards proposed during the negotiations
over the Act."~ After insisting on such a standard throughout the
negotiations, Congress's consent to a standard that does not refer to
job performance demonstrates that the Act rejected a job perfor-
mance requirement.z2  Consequently, supporters of the lenient
standard contend, Congress also rejected the requirement of strict
validation of employment practices. 3  The entire project of
validation involves demonstrating that the practices at issue measure,
predict, or are correlated with job performance. If the employer is
allowed to institute requirements that do not concern job perfor-
mance, it cannot be required to validate in every case.
The supporters of a lenient standard also argue that the second
part of the Act's standard, "consistent with business necessity,"
demonstrates that Congress did not enact a strict standard. 4 The
use of the word "consistent," rather than "required," as was used in
the 1990 Act, suggests that the employment practice need only serve
business needs, rather than be essential or indispensable to the
securing of these needs'3 Given this definition, any employment
requirement that is related to the job will satisfy business necessity.
The Act's language, then, in effect, codifies Wards Cove because any
228. Carvin, supra note 153, at 1159.
229. One should note, however, that if the exclusive legislative history provided for in
the Act precludes supporters of a strict necessity standard from citing the negotiations over
the Act in support of their position, it also ought to preclude the supporters of a lenient
standard from doing the same.
230. 137 CONG. REC. H3923 (daily ed. June 5, 1991).
231. See supra notes 155-95 and accompanying text.
232. Carvin, supra note 153, at 1159.
233. Id. at 1160.
234. Carvin, supra note 153, at 1158; Gray, supra note 148, at 1495-96.
235. Carvin, supra note 153, at 1158 ("The practice simply has to be connected with,
associated with, or related to business necessity, which is not a particularly demanding
standard.").
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employment practice that significantly serves legitimate employment
interests will be related to the job and consistent with business
necessity.
Finally, supporters of a lenient standard argue that the "Findings
and Purposes" sections of the Act do not explicitly overrule Wards
Cove.2 37 While the findings section implicitly criticizes Wards Cove
for weakening civil rights protections and the purposes section seeks
to codify the standard as it stood in the disparate impact cases prior
to Wards Cove, the Act, unlike the 1990 Act, never explicitly states
that Wards Cove should be overruled."3 8 Rather than forthrightly
rejecting the Wards Cove standard and risking a veto from the
President, Congress, in the words of Michael Carvin, "simply did not
resolve the question that had animated this two-year debate. In short,
the opposing sides of the 1991 Act simply agreed to disagree about
what substantive standard guided pre-Wards Cove case law and the
extent to which Wards Cove was faithful to that standard."2 39
Carvin and the rest of the Bush Administration were confident
when they agreed to the compromise embodied in the Act that the
Court would interpret Congress's directive to interpret the Act in light
of the decisions leading to Wards Cove as permission to reinstate the
Wards Cove standard. 24° In their desperation to avoid a presidential
veto, the Democrats, civil rights groups, and "moderate" Republican
Senators allowed themselves to be hoodwinked into accepting a bill
that in reality, even if not in literal terms, codifies the Wards Cove
standard.
D. Who Is Right?
If the legislature has the duty to articulate clear legal rules in its
statutes to the best of its ability, Congress may have shirked its duty
in crafting the business necessity provisions of the Act. When each
of two parties with diametrically opposing views plausibly can claim
that its views were codified by the legislation, Congress has failed to
legislate competently. Before we reach this harsh conclusion,
however, we should make one last attempt to scrutinize both the strict
necessity defense interpretation of the Act and the lenient necessity
236. Id at 1157-58.
237. See id. at 1160-61.
238. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, §§ 2, 3, 105 Stat. 1071, 1071 (noted
at 42 U.S.C. § 1981 note (1994)).
239. Carvin, supra note 153, at 1161.
240. Id at 1157, 1164.
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defense interpretation to see if one can refute the other so completely
that it is clear that the refuter's interpretation is the one embodied in
the Act.
In favor of the strict necessity interpretation, we can say that
even if one accepts the proposition that Congress did not explicitly
enact the strict necessity standard, the only thing that the disparate
impact provisions, taken as a whole, tell us for certain is that Wards
Cove is wrong. Congress demonstrated its disagreement with the
Wards Cove resolution of the business necessity problem by codifying
the disparate impact cause of action and placing the burden of
persuasion on the employer. 24' The only interpretation of the Act's
business necessity defense that should be ruled out as a matter of
course would be one that restores Wards Cove.
Rejecting the argument that the Act codifies the Wards Cove
standard, however, does not mean that the Act codifies the strict
business necessity standard. It is reasonable to ask that if Congress
desires to overrule the Supreme Court and enact a rule that the Court
has emphatically rejected, it should do so explicitly. No one could
argue with a straight face that the Act's definition of business
necessity is unambiguous. Indeed, it was the very ambiguity of the
language that made compromise possible.242
Also, the Act's command to interpret the definition of business
necessity according to the cases decided prior to Wards Cove presents
the proponents of the strict necessity defense with an insurmountable
problem. The strict necessity interpretation ultimately fails because
it relies on an interpretation of the Supreme Court precedent prior to
Wards Cove that ignores the true nature of the problems faced by the
Court in explaining the disparate impact cause of action.
The problems that confronted the Court in Beazer, Washington,
and Watson were quite real. These cases involved employment
practices, such as testing requirements for entrance into training
programs for jobs involving public safety, rules against hiring narcotics
users, and subjective hiring practices, all of which raised serious
questions about whether employers should be given more leeway in
these particular instances. The arguments used to distinguish the
241. Compare 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(1) (1994) (stating that an unlawful
employment practice based on disparate impact is established if the employer uses a
practice that has a disparate impact on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin and the employer cannot show the practice is job-related) with Wards Cove Packing
Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 659 (1989) (holding there is no requirement that challenged
practice be "essential" or "indispensable").
242. See supra notes 155-98 and accompanying text.
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Court's pronouncements in these cases cannot conceal the fact that as
the Court faced more difficult disparate impact cases, it began to
question the utility of the rigid interpretation of business necessity
advanced in Griggs, Albemarle Paper, and Dothard. One may not
agree with the Wards Cove solution to that problem, but one cannot
plausibly claim that the problem does not exist.
Aside from these problems, an interpretation of the Act
maintaining that it adopts the strict necessity approach does not
sufficiently account for the fact that two of the three indispensable
parties who produced the Act-the President and the "moderate"
Republican Senators-believed that the application of a strict, Griggs
business necessity standard in all cases was undesirable. While the
President and the moderate Republicans disagreed both as to what
the standard should be and as to what was finally enacted, they
agreed that the Act instituted something other than a uniform, strict
necessity standard. As was said of the Wards Cove standard, what
was enacted is open to debate, but it is certain that what was enacted
was not a rigid, strict necessity standard.
What interpretation is left? 'Two propositions concerning the
business necessity provisions of the Act are certain: (1) they instruct
the Court to implement neither the strict necessity standard of Griggs
nor the lenient standard of Wards Cove; and (2) they instruct the
Court to interpret these provisions according to its precedent,
excluding Wards Cove. If this precedent establishes two directly
opposed, irreconcilable lines of cases, the Act's definition of business
necessity is meaningless, and once the Court decides which of the
diverging paths it chooses to follow, the war over the disparate impact
standard will need to be refought.
IX however, the Supreme Court's attempts to define disparate
impact in the cases leading to Wards Cove were not in fact incoherent
or irreconcilable, then it might be possible to articulate a business
necessity standard that is neither absolutely strict nor absolutely
lenient. I contend that the Court's opinions, properly understood,
articulate the seeds of a moderate approach to the business necessity
defense that was successfully implemented by many lower courts
before Wards Cove established an absolute lenient standard and that
this moderate understanding of business necessity provides the best
possible interpretation of the Act.
II. A BETTER, MORE MODERATE APPROACH
The Act's definition of business necessity directs courts to look
to the pre-Wards Cove Supreme Court cases interpreting the defense.
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Because these cases articulate, at the very least, two different
standards of business necessity, the natural conclusion is that
Congress, desperate to overcome the main obstacle to a compromise,
enacted an incoherent standard and left it to the courts to make sense
of the mess. A closer examination of these cases, however, demon-
strates that the Court was neither indecisive nor inconsistent in
articulating the strict and lenient versions of business necessity.
Instead, there were good reasons why the Court articulated different
standards in different cases. Rather than applying one uniform, rigid
standard of business necessity, the Court applied the most appropriate
standard for the job in question, based on the special nature of each
job. In this Part, building on the foundation of these cases, I will
elucidate a moderate, flexible approach to business necessity that ties
the definition of the business necessity standard to the job in question.
A. The Foundation of the Moderate Standard
In the negotiations over the final form of the Act, Congress and
the President decided to settle their differences by leaving the precise
definition of business necessity to the courts.243 The language the
parties chose, "job-related for the position in question and consistent
with business necessity,"2' does not embody either of the extreme
standards. Instead, the parties decided to tell the judiciary to
interpret this provision in the same manner it had interpreted the
business necessity defense before Wards Cove Packing Co. v.
Atonio.245
If the Court precedents from Griggs v. Duke Power Co.2' up
to but not including Wards Cove do not establish any coherent
doctrine, then the Court is free to interpret the business necessity
defense any way it wishes, meaning that all the negotiations regarding
the Act settled nothing. If, however, the cases from Griggs through
Watson do construct a coherent, moderate approach to the question
of business necessity, then we can demonstrate that the Act es-
tablishes a particular standard of business necessity that is a true
compromise between the disputed positions.
A careful review of the relevant Supreme Court precedents
reveals that without ever directly articulating what it was doing, the
Court applied a two-tier standard of business necessity to disparate
243. See supra notes 146-242 and accompanying text.
244. 42 U.S.C. § 2000-e2(k)(1)(A)(i) (1994).
245. 490 U.S. 642 (1989); see supra notes 129-45 and accompanying text.
246. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
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impact cases before it decided to overhaul its approach to disparate
impact in Wards Cove. In other words, it applied different standards
of justification to different kinds of jobs. In cases in which the Court
examined practices governing less complex, entry-level jobs, it applied
the strict necessity standard. In cases in which complex jobs were at
issue, the Court applied a more lenient standard of business necessity.
The Court's first two cases arose in contexts in which the use of
a strict necessity test was appropriate. In Griggs, for example, the
Court applied the strict necessity standard to high school diploma and
general ability test requirements for jobs in the higher operating
departments of a power generating facility.247 In Albemarle Paper
Co. v. Moody,2" following Griggs, it applied the strict necessity
standard to general ability test requirements for jobs in a paper
nUll.
249
The Court abandoned the strict necessity approach in Washington
v. Davis.' In Washington, the Court held that an exam given to
police department applicants was sufficiently job-related because
successful performance on the exam correlated with higher scores in
the police training program, "wholly aside from its possible relation-
ship to actual performance as a police officer." 1  The Court
reasoned that "[i]t is ... apparent to us ... that some minimum
verbal and communicative skill would be very useful, if not essential,
to satisfactory progress in the training regimen. ' '1 2 Doubtless, the
employers in Griggs and Albemarle Paper would have argued that the
ability to communicate would be useful for their employees.
Nevertheless, the Court allowed the police department in Washington
more discretion than it gave the employers in Griggs and Albemarle
Paper.
Similar leeway was granted to the New York City Transit
Authority in New York City Transit Authority v. Beazer. 3 There,
the Court held that the no-methadone-users requirement was job-
related. 4 This statement was made without any analysis of the jobs
at issue. Indeed, the Court stated that the Authority's "legitimate
247. See supra notes 28-43 and accompanying text.
248. 422 U.S. 405 (1975).
249. See supra notes 44-56 and accompanying text.
250. 426 U.S. 229 (1976); see supra notes 57-73 and accompanying text.
251. Washington, 426 U.S. at 250.
252. Id.
253. 440 U.S. 568 (1979); see supra notes 85-93 and accompanying text.
254. Beazer, 440 U.S. at 587.
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employment goals of safety and efficiency" justified excluding
methadone users from positions with the Authority."5
The proponents of the strict necessity standard write off these
differences in doctrine either as dicta or simply as mistaken
statements of the Griggs standard.- The proponents of the more
flexible Wards Cove standard see these differences as evidence that
the Court could not articulate a sensible definition of the business
necessity defense without entirely restructuring the disparate impact
cause of action as proposed by the plurality in Wagon v. Fort Worth
Bank & Trus?5 6 and accomplished by the Court in its next case,
Wards Cove.2 7
Both of these explanations for the Court's seemingly
schizophrenic decisions are at once too convenient and too cynical.
Rather than demonstrating the Court's carelessness or the unfairness
of placing the burden of proving business necessity on employers,
these cases demonstrate that the Court had been lurching towards the
definition of a moderate business defense, a process that was cut off
by Wards Covey'
s
In the cases before Wards Cove, the Court applied a more
flexible standard of business necessity to complex jobs involving the
exercise of significant discretion than it did to entry level positions,
although it never characterized its decisions as establishing a new
standard. For example, in cases involving jobs that concern the
protection of the public, such as police and transit workers, the Court
applied a lenient standard of business necessity.29 On the other
hand, in cases involving less complex jobs, such as working in a power
plant or a paper mill, the Court applied the strict necessity stan-
dard.2" In short, the Court before Wards Cove applied a two-tier
standard of business necessity without naming it as such.
The one case that does not seem to fit the two-tier pattern is
Dothard v. Rawlinson,2' which concerned prison guards, a complex
255. 1& at 587 n.31.
256. 487 U.S. 977, 993-1000 (1988).
257. Compare Note, supra note 22, at 906 n.74 with Carvin, supra note 153, at 1161-62.
258. 490 U.S. 642 (1989); see supra notes 129-42 and accompanying text.
259. See New York Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 592-93 & n.39 (1979);
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 246-48 (1976). The Court in these cases held that
employers could establish business necessity by showing that their requirements were
sufficiently related to legitimate employment goals. See supra notes 57-73, 85-93 and
accompanying text.
260. See Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975); Griggs v. Duke
Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 436 (1971).
261. 433 U.S. 321 (1977); see supra notes 74-84 and accompanying text.
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job involving public safety. Under a two-tier standard, the Court
should have applied a lenient standard of business necessity to the
height and weight requirements for prison guards. Instead, it seemed
to apply a strict standard, holding that the defendant must prove that
the employment practice was "essential to good job performance."' 62
A closer examination of the opinion, however, reveals that the
Court's opinion cannot be taken as an authoritative statement of what
kind of proof of business necessity is needed to justify practices for a
complex job. While the Court in Dothard used language consistent
with a strict standard, it never had to apply that standard in the case
because the employer did not submit any evidence in support of its
practices." In other words, it cannot be said that the Court in
Dothard intended that a strict necessity standard be applied to
complex jobs because the defendant did not really attempt to justify
its standards in that case. In fact, Justice Rehnquist, in his concurring
opinion, warned that the Court's ruling was "essentially dictated by
the peculiarly limited factual and legal justifications" offered by the
defendants on behalf of their practices.2" In another case, a
defendant could very well present evidence that would persuade a
court to hold that the employer's height and weight requirements
were justified.2"
The Court's de facto acceptance of a moderate standard of
business necessity in the cases before Wards Cove is evident in the
many pleas for flexibility in the application of the business necessity
standard made in those cases. In Albemarle Paper, for example, Chief
Justice Burger and Justice Blackmun both expressed concern that the
strict necessity standard articulated in that case would be interpreted
as instructing courts to require strict EEOC Guidelines validation in
every case. Chief Justice Burger, for example, argued that "slavish
adherence to the EEOC Guidelines regarding test validation should
not be required." 66 Justice Blackmun continued this theme, stating
that "a too-rigid application of the EEOC Guidelines will leave the
employer little choice, save an impossibly expensive and complex
validation study, but to engage in a subjective quota system of
employment selection." 7
262. Dothard, 433 U.S. at 331.
263. Id.
264. Id. at 337 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
265. Id. at 339 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
266. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405,452 (1975) (Burger, C.J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part).
267. Id. at 449 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
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The final proof of the Court's de facto acceptance of a flexible
standard of business necessity in the pre-Wards Cove cases comes
from Justice Blackmun's opinion in Watson. This opinion is impor-
tant because Blackmun, joined by Brennan and Marshall, articulated
the primary alternative to the new structure of the disparate impact
cause of action elucidated by the Watson plurality and adopted in
Wards Cove. While Blackmun stated that he wished to preserve the
strict necessity standard defined in Griggs and Albemarle Paper, he
defined the standard differently than the Court had previously.2"s
Rather than requiring that the employer validate its practices,
Blackmun characterized the Court's earlier cases as instructing courts
to make "a case-specific judgment which must take into account the
nature of the particular business and job in question. 2 69 In other
words, those Justices who wished to preserve the Court's existing
approach to business necessity and opposed the Watson plurality's
proposed restructuring of the disparate impact cause of action
contended that the existing approach was workable precisely because
it applied a flexible definition of business necessity. The Court's
decisions, even if undertheorized, confirm that it was not wedded to
a rigid definition of business necessity.
In sum, before it definitively changed direction in Wards Cove,
the Court defined business necessity on a case-by-case basis, taking
due account of the nature of the job at issue. This prudent approach,
while it was never fully explained by the Court, best captures the
intent of the parties that supported the Act. Thus, the Act's
instructions to the judiciary to interpret the business necessity defense
as it did before Wards Cove require courts to tailor the business
necessity justification to the job at issue. Application of a flexible,
two-tier standard best satisfies Congress's mandate. The effective
application of this standard, however, requires a far more thorough
elaboration and defense of this standard than the Court was able to
supply in these cases. This Article will now define and defend this
two-tier standard.
268. Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 1005-06 (Blackmun, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
269. ld. at 1005 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
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B. Defining the Standard
1. The Purposes of Title VII
Since the Act's original enactment in 1964, the Court has
frequently stated that Title VII should be interpreted in light of its
purposes 70 Because the statute represents our society's commit-
ment to bring previously excluded groups into the workplace, the
primary purposes of Title VII are the elimination of discrimination in
the workplace and the dismantling of arbitrary barriers to equal
employment opportunity.27 Title VH, however, was not intended
and is not designed to achieve these purposes at all costs. As the
Court stated in its latest pronouncement regarding the federal
employment discrimination laws, a law such as Title VII "is not a
general regulation of the workplace but a law which prohibits
discrimination. [Such a] statute does not constrain employers from
exercising significant other prerogatives and discretions in the course
of the hiring, firing, and the discharge of their employees."7"
Thus, courts must interpret Title VII in a manner that will both
facilitate the removal of arbitrary barriers to equal employment
opportunities and protect legitimate employer prerogatives. In other
words, in designing Title VII, Congress intended that there be limits
to the extent courts will interfere with the employment practices of
employers.
The structure of the statute demonstrates that Congress intended
both to eliminate discrimination in the workplace and to preserve
legitimate employer discretion. For example, § 2000e-2(h) of Title
VII protects the right of employers to institute or retain bona fide
seniority or merit systems.273 In fact, seniority systems are protected
even if they have a disparate impact on disadvantaged groups.
274
The same section also protects the right of employers (qualified by
the need to demonstrate business necessity) to give and act upon the
results of professionally developed ability tests. 5 Section 2000e-2(j)
270. See McKennon v. Nashville Banner Pub. Co., 115 S. Ct. 879, 884 (1995); United
Steelworkers of America v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 201-04 (1979); Albemarle Paper Co. v.
Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 417-18 (1975); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429-30
(1971).
271. See Albemarle Paper, 422 U.S. at 417-18; Griggs, 401 U.S. at 429-30.
272. McKennon, 115 S. Ct. at 886 (citations omitted).
273. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1994).




precludes any interpretation of Title VII that would require preferen-
tial treatment of any group on the basis of race, color, religion,
gender, or national origin in response to any numerical imbalance in
the group composition of the workforce. 6  To put it simply,
employers cannot be required to use quotas in choosing their
workforce. 277
In addition to these kinds of specific protections, the remedial
structure of Title VII is designed to encourage, not force, cooperation
from employers in eliminating discrimination from the workplace. In
the words of the Court, "Congress designed the remedial measures in
[statutes such as Title VII] to serve as a 'spur or catalyst' to cause
employers 'to self-examine and to self-evaluate their employment
practices and to endeavor to eliminate, so far as possible, the last
vestiges' of discrimination."'278  These measures call for the
employment of more informal administrative processes in order to
.persuade employers to change their employment practices. Lawsuits
are filed when the employer refuses to remedy any identified
problems within a reasonable period of time.279
276. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(j) (1994).
277. See Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 652 (1989).
278. McKennon v. Nashville Banner Pub. Co., 115 S. Ct. 879, 884 (1995) (quoting
Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 417-18 (1975)).
279. For example, under Title VII, before an employee can sue in federal court, he
must file a charge with the EEOC, which will then investigate the charge. 42 U.S.C. §
2000e-5(f)(1) (1994). If there is reasonable cause to believe that the employer has violated
Title VII, neither the EEOC nor the employee are authorized to file suit before the EEOC
attempts to encourage the employer to voluntarily reform its practices through the
conciliation process. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (1994) ("If the Commission determines after
such investigation that there is reasonable cause to believe that the charge is true, the
Commission shall endeavor to eliminate any such alleged unlawful employment practice
by informal methods of conference, conciliation, and persuasion."). The complexity of this
remedial scheme arose out of the original legislative bargain to enact Title VII, in which
supporters of the statute sought to reassure hesitant legislators and nervous employers that
they had devised a remedial scheme which would protect employer prerogatives to the
fullest extent possible. The report of the House Judiciary Committee on Title VII, for
example, states:
It must also be stressed that the Commission must confine its activities to
correcting abuse, not promoting equality with mathematical certainty. In this
regard, nothing in the title permits a person to demand employment. Of greater
importance, the Commission will only jeopardize its continued existence if it
seeks to impose forced racial balance upon employers or labor unions. Similarly,
management prerogatives, and union freedoms, are to be left undisturbed to the
greatest extent possible. Internal affairs of employers aind labor organizations
must not be interfered with except to the limited extent that correction is
required in discrimination practices.
H.R. REP. No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, at 29 (1963) (additional remarks made by
Rep. William M. McCulloch) (emphasis added).
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When interpreting Title VII, Courts should both seek to prevent
discrimination and to ensure equal employment opportunities for
previously disadvantaged groups by dismantling arbitrary barriers to
employment. In serving these purposes, however, courts must protect
the legitimate prerogatives of employers.
2. The Importance of Quotas and the Impossibility of a Pure
Strict Necessity Standard
Employers will be allowed to retain practices that dispropor-
tionately disqualify members of disadvantaged groups when they
demonstrate some quantum of business necessity. In other words,
employers must show that their prerogatives as employers trump
concerns of removing barriers to equal employment opportunity in a
particular instance. Thus, a sound definition of the business necessity
defense depends on a sound understanding of the legitimate
prerogatives of employers under Title VII.
As discussed, the statute itself delineates the fundamental
prerogatives of employers.' While employers must eliminate
practices that impair equal employment opportunity, they cannot be
forced to hire members of particular groups in order to achieve some
particular numerical group distribution of employees. In other words,
they cannot be forced to impose quotas."s The key term here is
"forced."' If the business necessity defense is defined so narrowly
that it is impossible for employers to meet the standard, then they will
be forced to do one of two things: They will either discontinue using
the practice that causes a disparate impact, or they will continue to
use the standard, but will attempt to avert any potential liability by
using hiring quotas, ostensibly because the practice is so vital to the
operation of the business.
Since the recognition of the disparate impact cause of action in
Griggs, the Court has made it quite clear that employers are entitled
to more discretion in operating their businesses than is illustrated by
280. See supra notes 273-79 and accompanying text.
281. Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 652 (1989) (stating that the
forced adoption of racial quotas "is a result that Congress expressly rejected in drafting
Title VII." (citations omitted)).
282. Under Title VII, employers may choose to engage in affirmative action. But this
privilege is qualified; employers may engage in affirmative action only if it is meant to
remedy a demonstrated historical imbalance in the industry in question, if it is temporary,
and if it does not unnecessarily trammel the rights of members' groups that are awarded
preferences under the employer's program. See United Steelworkers of America v. Weber,
443 U.S. 193, 208-09 (1979).
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the above scenario. No matter how strictly the Supreme Court has
interpreted the business necessity defense, the Court has never
defined it so narrowly that it is impossible for employers to meet.
The cases that define the business necessity the most strictly--Griggs,
Albemarle Paper, and Dothard-all state that if the employer can
prove the necessity of its requirements, then use of the practice will
be allowed.' The text and structure of Title VII, it must be
understood, require that the employer be given such an opportunity;
if courts do not afford employers any chance to prove business
necessity, then they will be imposing quotas on the employers,
contrary to the explicit instructions of the statute.'
The strict necessity cases provide this statutorily required
opportunity to prove business necessity by allowing an employer to
validate its job requirements in accordance with the EEOC
Guidelines. To quote the crucial language from Albemarle Paper
once again, the Court stated that "[t]he message of these Guidelines
is the same as that of the Griggs case-that discriminatory tests are
impermissible unless shown, by professionally acceptable methods, to
be 'predictive of or significantly correlated with important elements
of work behavior which comprise or are relevant to the job.' "'
This strict necessity, EEOC Guidelines-based approach, however,
must be founded on the premise that validation is possible for the
jobs at issue in the litigation. It is this potential for validation that
protects employers from the impossible choice between eliminating
job practices that they consider crucial to the operation of the
business and the imposition of quotas. As long as validation is
possible, the strict necessity approach is feasible both under the
structure of Title VII and in practice. 6 This validation need not be
easy, it need only be possible.
If it is impossible to validate essential job requirements for
particular kinds of jobs, however, then the EEOC Guidelines standard
283. See supra notes 28-56 and 74-84 and accompanying text.
284. See 42 U.S.C §§ 2000e-2(h), (j) (1994); Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 659; EPSTEIN,
supra note 11, at 233-36.
285. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 431 (1975) (quoting 29 C.F.R. §
1607.4(c) (1971)).
286. In this section, I am analyzing the propriety of different standards of business
necessity under the basic structure of Title VII without directly considering the definition
contained in the Act. My argument-that because it is impossible to validate some jobs,
the application of the strict necessity standard in all cases would be inconsistent with the
scheme contained in Title VI-is a reason to reject a pure strict necessity standard
independent of any reading of language of the Act.
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cannot be applied to employer attempts to justify these practices in a
manner consistent with Title VII. Put another way, employers cannot
cast doubt on the strict necessity standard by showing the cost or
difficulty of validating their job requirements. However, if they can
show that validation is impossible for the necessary requirements of
particular jobs, then they can show that the imposition of the strict
necessity standard in these particular cases would be a de facto
imposition of quotas in clear contravention of Title VII. The
existence of any necessary job requirements for which scientific
validation is not possible would compel the development of a different
standard of business necessity for jobs with such requirements.
In interpreting Title VII, the Supreme Court has recognized the
possibility of the existence of jobs for which EEOC Guidelines
validation is impossible.' Indeed, even Justices advocating the
strict Griggs standard have been forced to acknowledge that EEOC
Guidelines validation may not always be appropriate. For example,
in his opinion opposing the plurality in Watson, Justice Blackmun
conceded that EEOC Guidelines validation "may sometimes not be
effective in measuring the job-relatedness" of some practices.m
Justice Blackmun concluded that "[t]he fact that job-relatedness
cannot always be established with mathematical certainty does not
free an employer from its burden of proof, but rather requires a trial
court to look to different forms of evidence to assess an employer's
claim of business necessity.
' 2
What these Justices do not understand or acknowledge, however,
is that once one concedes that validation is impossible for certain jobs
and other forms of proof of business necessity must be accepted, one
has conceded that the strict necessity standard cannot be used in all
cases. The heart of the strict necessity approach is the requirement
of scientific validation or, in Justice Blackmun's words, proving the
287. See, e.g., Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 991-92 (1988).
288. Id. at 1006 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
While acknowledging the possibility that Guidelines validation may not always be
appropriate, Justice Blackmun, in a footnote, states that the author of the Guidelines, the
American Psychological Association, contends that scientific validation is possible for job
requirements used in complex jobs. Id. at 1007 n.5 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment). Thus, advocates of the EEOC Guidelines approach,
understanding that the utility of scientific validation is at the heart of their approach,
refuse to concede that validation is impossible for some jobs. See Bartholet, supra note
50, at 987-88.




need for one's requirements "with mathematical certainty."2' 9 As
one scholar has stated, the Guidelines transplant "strict standards of
validity from the theoretical context of scientific inquiry to the
practical context of employment decisions."' If one cannot
produce scientific proof, the proponents of the strict standard argue,
one should not use a practice that deprives particular groups of equal
employment opportunities. Once one has admitted that this
validation requirement is not appropriate, one has acknowledged both
that the strict necessity standard does not work in all cases and that
we need to articulate another standard.
3. Defining the Two-Tier Standard
Because there are jobs in which the job requirements measuring
necessary qualities cannot be validated, a different business necessity
standard must be applied to these positions in order to protect
fundamental employer prerogatives.
What, then, are the jobs that require the use of practices that
cannot be validated? They are jobs which require abilities that cannot
be measured by the scientific validation techniques described in the
EEOC Guidelines. In the Watson plurality opinion, Justice O'Connor
identified some of these particular abilities and the problems in
measuring them:
Some qualities-for example, common sense, good
judgment, originality, ambition, loyalty, and tact--cannot be
measured accurately through standardized testing techniques.
Moreover, success at many jobs in which such qualities are
crucial cannot itself be measured directly. Opinions often
differ when managers and supervisors are evaluated, and the
same can be said for many jobs that involve close
cooperation with one's co-workers or complex and subtle
tasks like the provision of professional services or personal
counseling.292
Thus, there are some jobs that require intangible qualities like
judgment and common sense that cannot be measured by practices
that can be validated. It is impossible to devise a test to measure an
applicant's wisdom or ability to motivate co-workers. One therefore
cannot scientifically validate employer practices, such as interviews or
290. Id (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
291. Rutherglen, supra note 12, at 1315.
292. Watson, 487 U.S. at 991-92 (plurality opinion).
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soliciting recommendations, that are aimed at determining whether an
employee possesses these intangible qualities.
In addition to the problem of measuring intangible qualities, the
project of scientific validation faces another hurdle. There are some
jobs, such as management or the provision of professional advice or
analysis, in which success is difficult to measure objectively.
Employer practices that seek to measure performance for these kinds
of positions, then, would be impossible to validate. The strict
necessity standard could not be applied to these practices consistently
with Title VII's protections of employer prerogatives.
A review of the scientific validation techniques authorized by the
EEOC Guidelines confirms that employers cannot hope to scientifical-
ly validate practices that attempt to measure either intangible qualities
or performance in a job requiring complex skills. There are three
techniques of validation approved by the Guidelines: criterion,
content, and construct validation.293  The Guidelines and .these
techniques of validation are intended to apply to selection procedures
that are used as a basis for any employment decision.294 Employers
may satisfy the requirements of the Guidelines by relying upon studies
using any of the three techniques of validation, as long as the study
conducted meets the Guidelines' technical criteria.295
Criterion validation, the technique of validation most favored by
the Guidelines, requires the employer to establish a statistically
significant correlation between successful performance on a selection
device, such as a test, and successful performance of the job judged
by acceptable measures of work performance.296 These measures of
work performance should "represent critical or important job duties,
work behaviors or work outcomes as developed from [a] review of job
293. 29 C.F.R. §§ 1607.14A-D, 1607.5A (1995).
294. 29 C.F.R. § 1607.2B (1995). At first glance, the EEOC Guidelines seem to allow
for the possibility that employers can justify their employment practices without
performing validation studies. Id- § 1607.6B ("There are circumstances in which a user
cannot or need not utilize the validation techniques contemplated by these guidelines.").
However, in the very section that appears to allow this flexibility, the EEOC Guidelines
state that if an employer wishes to use "informal or unscored" procedures, it should
"eliminate the adverse impact, or modify the procedure to one which is a formal, scored,
or quantified measure or combination of measures and then validate the procedure in
accord with these guidelines." Id. § 1607.6B(i). So if the employer wishes to use a
practice that is not amenable to validation, it must either make sure there is no adverse
impact or modify the practice to an objective one. In other words, an employer can avoid
the validation requirement only if its practices do not have any adverse impact, meaning
that it can justify its practices only by validating them.
295. 29 C.F.R. § 1607.5A (1995).
296. Rutherglen, supra note 12, at 1317.
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information."297 This technique of validation thus requires that the
employer devise a method of objectively measuring job performance
so that it can be compared with a score on an objective test. Only by
reducing work performance to an empirical measure can the required
statistical study be carried out.
Because this technique of validation is effective only for jobs in
which job duties or behaviors can be identified and empirically
measured, criterion validation cannot be used with jobs that involve
complex skills, such as high level management or the professions.
Performance of these jobs can effectively be measured only through
subjective evaluations such as supervisor reviews. In fact, the EEOC
Guidelines caution against the use of these very kinds of evaluations
in criterion studies because of the possibility of bias.298 As there is
essentially no way to construct an objective measure of performance
in jobs that involve the use of skills such as judgment, one cannot
perform the required statistical study. Because of the difficulty in
measuring job performance for all but the most simple jobs, successful
use of this technique of validation has been rar299
The second method of validation, content validation, is the most
straightforward. Employers may validate a selection practice by
demonstrating that it is "a representative sample of the content of the
job."'" The typing test for hiring typists is the obvious example of
a content-based selection practice because it directly measures job
performance. This technique of validation does not work for jobs
involving complex tasks for the same reason the criterion validation
technique does not work. If job performance cannot be measured
empirically, one cannot devise a content-based practice for selecting
an applicant for that position. Indeed, the EEOC Guidelines state
that "a content strategy is not appropriate for demonstrating the
validity of selection procedures which purport to measure traits or
constructs, such as intelligence, aptitude, personality, common sense,
judgment, leadership and spatial ability.
' 0'
The final technique of validation is construct validation.
Employers may validate their practices by empirically demonstrating
that "the selection procedure measures the degree to which candidates
have identifiable characteristics which have been determined to be
297. 29 C.F.R. § 1607.14B(2) (1995).
298. Id.
299. Rutherglen, supra note 12, at 1317.
300. 29 C.F.R. § 1607.14C(1) (1995).
301. Id.
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important for successful job performance. '3"" Employers thus must
prove two things: (1) that a practice or test measures an abstract
ability and (2) that this ability is correlated with successful job
performance.3 3 Construct validation is only effective if both the job
at issue can be objectively evaluated and the abilities needed to
perform that job can be empirically measured. If performance of a
particular job cannot be measured or the successful performance of
the job calls for an ability that cannot be empirically measured, then
construct validation is not possible. Complex jobs, which require the
use of common sense, judgment, or other intangible qualities, cannot
be validated for both reasons; one can measure neither job perfor-
mance for these positions nor the abilities these jobs require."
Before the Supreme Court finally attempted to settle the law in
Wards Cove, lower federal courts perceived these problems in
validating selection practices for particular kinds of jobs under the
Guidelines. Many lower courts formulated a variety of doctrines
designed to deal with jobs that arguably required employers to use
practices that were difficult or even impossible to validate.
302. 29 C.F.R. § 1607.16E (1995). The EEOC Guidelines warn that construct validation
is particularly difficult, requiring "an extensive and arduous effort involving a series of
research studies.... Users choosing to justify use of a selection procedure by this strategy
should therefore take particular care to assure that the validity study meets the standards
set forth [in the Guidelines.]" 29 C.F.R. § 1607.14D(1) (1995).
303. Rutherglen, supra note 12, at 1324.
304. Elizabeth Bartholet argued that the Guidelines validation requirements should be
applied to complex jobs. Bartholet, supra note 50, at 986-89. She was supported in this
view, she maintained, by the industrial psychology literature. Id. at 988. In discussing the
application of the different validation techniques, however, Bartholet recognized the
difficulty in using these techniques for validating practices concerning complex jobs. For
example, she conceded that "[a] meaningful job analysis will be difficult for many upper
level jobs, because we are uncertain what constitutes good performance," and that
"without an adequate job analysis, validation is impossible." Id. at 1010.
Bartholet was even less confident about the feasibility of using the other validation
techniques in the complex job context. To illustrate, she remarked that while content
validation was considered "appropriate for jobs that consist primarily of a few simple tasks,
[it] provides little justification for upper level ... selection systems." Id. at 1016. With
regard to construct validation, Bartholet commented that while this kind of validation
demands empirical proof, the experts had not yet agreed on how to conduct this kind of
validation study. Id. at 1019.
In the years since the publication of Bartholet's article, it has become clear that,
despite what some might have expected in 1982, industrial psychology has not developed
to the point where it has substantially overcome the problems of validation identified by
Bartholet. See Rutherglen, supra note 12, at 1318. Indeed, one could argue that our
society's skepticism towards the entire project of the empirical measurement of intangible
qualities such as intelligence has increased dramatically. See RICHARD HERRNSTEIN &
CHARLES MURRAY, THE BELL CURVE (1994); THE BELL CURVE DEBATE (R. Jacoby &
N. Glauberman eds., 1995).
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Before Wards Cove, several federal circuits adhered to what was
known as the Spurlock doctrine, which originated.from the Tenth
Circuit's seminal decision in Spurlock v. United Airlines, Inc3 5 The
Spurlock court addressed the question of whether requirements for
the selection of airline pilots could be justified under the business
necessity standard.3" The court maintained that employers should
bear a lighter burden in proving job-relatedness if the job at issue
clearly requires a high degree of skill and the economic and human
risks involved in hiring an unqualified applicant are great. Courts
approving the Spurlock doctrine generally applied it to jobs that
involved public safety, such as police officers or firefighters.
3 8
The Fifth Circuit's decision in Davis v. City of Dallas 9 was a
paradigmatic application of the Spurlock doctrine.310 In Davis, the
court considered a challenge to several Dallas police department
requirements, including one that applicants for positions earn at least
forty-five semester hours of college credit with at least a "C" average
at an accredited college or university.31' In determining which
standard of business necessity to apply, the court held that "the
professional nature of a Dallas police officer's job distinguishes it...
from positions which have been previously evaluated in the Title VII
decisions of the Supreme Court. ',3' Recognizing the difficulty in
validating complex jobs, the court held that "the danger the hiring of
an unqualified police officer might pose to the public and the
impossibility of reducing job characteristics to measurable components
separate the position of police officer from jobs considered in cases
where validation studies were required." '313
Giving the employer the benefit of a lower burden of jus-
tification, the court concluded that "[b]ecause of the professional
nature of the job, coupled with the risks and responsibility inherent
305. 475 F.2d 216 (10th Cir. 1972).
306. Id at 219.
307. Id. at 219.
308. E.g., Davis v. City of Dallas, 777 F.2d 205, 213-215 (5th Cir. 1985); Chrisner v.
Complete Auto Transit, Inc., 645 F.2d 1251, 1262-63 (6th Cir. 1981); Townsend v. Nassau
County Medical Ctr., 558 F.2d 117, 120 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1015 (1978);
Boyd v. Ozark Air Lines, 568 F.2d 50, 54 (8th Cir. 1977).
309. 777 F.2d 205 (5th Cir. 1985).
310. Id. at 213-18.
311. Id. The other practices challenged were a requirement that a successful applicant
not have a history of recent or excessive marijuana use and a requirement that a successful
applicant not exceed a certain number of traffic citations. Id.
312. Id at 216.
313. Id. at 217.
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in the position... empirical evidence is not required to validate the
job-relatedness of the educational requirement. 3 14  The court
stressed that it was not relieving the city from producing any proof of
job-relatedness; it held only that the city did not have to meet the
strict standards of validation articulated in Albemarle Paper and
Griggs." 5 Accepting evidence such as national studies and expert
testimony rather than specially prepared validation studies, the court
held that the employer successfully met its burden of justification for
all its practices.1 6
Another category of cases concerning jobs for which objective
validation is difficult involves promotion decisions in universities. In
these cases, similar to those decided under the Spurlock doctrine,
several courts have given employers more discretion than seems
warranted under Griggs, Albemarle Paper, and Dothard. For
example, in Zahorik v. Cornell University,"' the Second Circuit held
that a university could maintain its tenure criteria if the criteria were
"legitimately related to the position of tenured professor. 31 8 The
court did not require empirical validation of either the university's
tenure requirements or its subjective peer review tenure process. 319
To courts following the Zahorik approach, the difficulty of validating
selection practices for professional positions justified affording
colleges and universities more deference in making their professional
employment decisions than was given to other employers."'
Finally, to deal with the infeasibilty of validation, some federal
courts went so far as to hold that subjective hiring practices, such as
interviews, could never be challenged under a disparate impact
theory.321 This view, which the Court rejected in Watson, was based
on the notion that employers would never be able to validate
subjective hiring practices under the EEOC Guidelines standards.3"
While rejecting the blanket exemption for subjective hiring practices
314. Id.
315. Id,
316. Id. at 218-26.
317. 729 F.2d 85 (2d Cir. 1984).
318. Id. at 96.
319. Id at 95-96.
320. See, e.g., Merwine v. Board of Trustees, 754 F.2d 631, 639-41 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 474 U.S. 823 (1985); Carpenter v. Board of Regents, 728 F.2d 911, 914 (7th Cir.
1984); Campbell v. Ramsay, 631 F.2d 597, 598 (8th Cir. 1980).
321. See, eg., Talley v. United States Postal Serv., 720 F.2d 505, 506-07 (8th Cir. 1983),
cert. denied, 466 U.S. 952 (1984); Pope v. City of Hickory, 679 F.2d 20,22 (4th Cir. 1982);
Pouncy v. Prudential Ins. Co., 668 F.2d 795, 801 (5th Cir. 1982).
322. Rutherglen, supra note 12, at 1342.
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from disparate impact analysis, the Watson plurality responded to the
problems raised by these courts by contending that a more lenient
standard of business necessity should be applied to all cases.
32
All three of these lines of cases responded to the problem of
employment selection practices that cannot be validated under the
EEOC Guidelines. While the cases arose in slightly different
contexts, the decisions contained the foundation for a standard of
business necessity that will enable employers to justify their necessary
practices while still promoting equal employment opportunity for
disadvantaged groups.
The principle that unites these lines of doctrine is that
employment practices governing jobs that at their core require the
possession of intangible qualities or the performance of complex tasks
cannot be subjected to the strict validation test.324 These jobs
include, but are not limited to, high-level managerial positions and
professional positions such as doctor, lawyer, or university professor.
Any job in which the employee must be afforded a significant amount
of discretion because the job duties require her to solve complex
problems using intangible skills such as judgment or tact would be
included in this category.3" For example, police officers would be
included, as would other positions in which employees are responsible
for the health and safety of others.
32
The special nature of these jobs requires employers to use
selection and evaluation procedures that are designed to determine
whether the applicant possesses complex qualities or skills. The only
kinds of employment practices that work in this context are subjective
practices, such as interviews, supervisor evaluations, and requirements
that serve as proxies for the qualities or skills desired.327 These
proxies include college degree requirements and relevant work
experience. Because these practices do not seek to measure quan-
tifiable skills or performance, they cannot be scientifically validated.
In order to give employers an opportunity to prove the need for these
323. Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977,989 (1988); see also supra notes
94-128 and accompanying text.
324. See Rutherglen, supra note 12, at 1343-44 ("Complexity, not status, should
determine the appropriate standards for validation.").
325. ld. at 1343.
326. Alito, supra note 83, at 1035.
327. Rutherglen, supra note 12, at 1344 ("Jobs consisting of a variety of duties, with few
simple measures of successful performance, generally require selection procedures that
cannot be scientifically validated, such as subjective evaluations and objective qualifications
of education and experience.").
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practices, a more lenient form of the business necessity defense must
be articulated.
For jobs in which the qualifications needed for successful
performance can be measured objectively, the Act requires the
application of the strict necessity standard. The strict necessity
standard forces employers to make the most rigorous showing of
business necessity possible. Employers may retain practices that
produce a disparate impact only if they meet this high burden of
proof. This strict standard ensures that offending practices will be
maintained only in cases where employers are willing to incur the high
costs of scientific validation. On the other hand, the fact that this
strict requirement is applied only in cases where validation is possible
ensures that employers will not be forced to impose quotas. Because
employers are able to choose whether or not they wish to validate,
they still may exercise their fundamental prerogatives.
C. Defending the Standard
1. The Need for a Strict Standard for Most Jobs
As articulated by the Court, the purpose of the disparate impact
cause of action is to serve the primary purposes of Title VII by
attacking the more subtle forms of discrimination.3" Discrimination
against the historically disadvantaged does not take only the form of
overt, intentional discrimination. This most obvious form of
discrimination is effectively addressed by the disparate treatment
cause of action alone. There are three other forms of discrimination,
however, that can be effectively remedied only by a powerful
disparate impact cause of action accompanied by a strict business
necessity defense 29
328. This Article does not seek to articulate the author's preferred policy regarding
employment discrimination law in general or the disparate impact cause of action in
particular. Its goal is to elucidate the most accurate and workable interpretation of what
Congress and the President agreed to in the Act. If given a free hand to devise the best
policy regarding discrimination in the workplace, the author would offer a different
solution to these problems than the one presented here. This Article should be judged
primarily on whether it presents a sensible interpretation of policies embodied in the Act,
not whether it articulates the ideal policy regarding the problems of race and employment.
329. Richard Epstein argues that the benefits of eliminating subtle forms of
discrimination by the strict necessity version of the disparate impact cause of action would
be far outweighed by the costs to society of such an approach. EPSTEIN, supra note 11,
at 231-33. He does not dispute that placing such a burden on employers is the most
effective way for the law to reach this kind of discrimination. Id.
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The first form of subtle discrimination is pretextual
discrimination, which is intentional discrimination hidden behind a
veneer of facially neutral practices?3 For example, an employer
may implement a high school degree requirement or an ability test
requirement with the knowledge that African-Americans will be
disproportionately disqualified by the requirement. Unless the
plaintiff can discover direct evidence of the employer's discriminatory
intent, a highly unlikely occurrence, a disparate treatment cause of
action will never root out this discrimination because the disqualified
applicant's failure to meet a seemingly reasonable and neutral
requirement will always provide the employer with a defense for its
failure to hire the applicant.33'
The disparate impact cause of action combats pretextual
discrimination by forcing employers to defend their facially neutral
practices with proof of an objective need for the practice. Employers
cannot simply implement a practice because it is neutral on its face or
because it seems reasonable. If a plaintiff can show that the practice
has a disparate impact, the burden shifts to the employer to show that
business necessity justifies the practice. The more difficult it is to
establish business necessity, the more likely it is that the employer is
lying about the real reason for the implementation of the practice. If
the employer can, as the strict necessity standard requires, scientifical-
ly validate its requirements, there can be no greater assurance that the
practice was instituted without any intent to discriminate.
An even more subtle form of discrimination is statistical
discrimination, which takes place when an employer does not have
any animus against a particular group but nevertheless believes that
the members of the group are less productive on average than
members of other groups. 332 In response to this belief, the employer
institutes neutral practices that will disproportionately disqualify this
group.333 The employer could, for example, recruit employees from
330. Strauss, supra note 14, at 1649; see also Rutherglen, supra note 12, at 1304-07
(describing how Congress addressed pretextual discrimination in Title VII). The classic
work on the economics of discrimination is GARY S. BECKER, THE ECONOMICS OF
DISCRIMINATION (2d ed. 1971).
331. Strauss, supra note 14, at 1649 ("[T]he disparate treatment approach will detect
discrimination only when the victim can demonstrate that he or she was as productive as
some nonminority employee.").
332. Id. at 1622. The classic articulations of the theory of statistical discrimination are
Kenneth J. Arrow, The Theory of Discrimination, in DISCRIMINATION IN LABOR
MARKETS 3, 23-32 (Orley Ashenfelter & Albert Rees eds., 1973) and Edmund S. Phelps,
The Statistical Theory of Racism and Sexism, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 659, 659 (1972).
333. Strauss, supra note 14, at 1622; Rutherglen, supra note 12, at 1311.
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particular areas, so as to hire particular groups and avoid others. This
kind of discrimination is especially difficult to combat, even with a
disparate impact cause of action, because the employer is not acting
out of animus toward the group. Instead, the employer is seeking to
maximize productivity while minimizing the costs of hiring employees.
Given that the employer's purpose in fashioning its practices is
increased efficiency, it is likely that it will be able to articulate
objective reasons in support of its practices.
There is evidence that statistical discrimination is widespread and
quite harmful to disadvantaged groups. For example, one study found
that most employers surveyed in Chicago believed that inner-city
African-Americans were less productive than members of other
groups.34 They devised their employment practices to screen out
these applicants, using an array of practices including skills tests,
personal interviews, and references.335 These practices were used in
selecting employees for a wide range of jobs, including sales, customer
service, clerical, and low-skilled laboring or service jobs.336 Thus,
statistical discrimination by these employers presented a formidable
obstacle to African-Americans seeking employment in Chicago.
A related, and still more subtle, form of discrimination is
unconscious discrimination. This kind of discrimination results from
the ingrained desire of majority groups to maintain their superior
position over minority groups.337 The most obvious example is some
white Americans' unconscious desire to be superior to African-
Americans?" This unconscious need to maintain superiority
manifests itself in the use of employment practices that dispropor-
tionately disqualify the minority group. This kind of discrimination
is extremely difficult to detect because the employer truly believes it
is acting on neutral motives; given this belief certainly the employer
will have a neutral explanation for its practices. Indeed, because the
334. Joleen Kirschenman & Kathryn M. Neckerman, "We'd Love to Hire Them, But
.": The Meaning of Race for Employers, in THE URBAN UNDERCLASS 203, 209
(Christopher Jencks and Paul Peterson eds., 1991).
335. Id. at 231.
336. lId at 218-30.
337. See Mary E. Becker, Needed in the Nineties: Improved Individual and Structural
Remedies for Racial and Sexual Disadvantages in Employment, 79 GEO. L.J. 1659, 1671
(1991).
338. BELL, supra note 15, at 159 ("[P]rogress in American race relations is largely a
mirage, obscuring the fact that whites continue, consciously or unconsciously, to do all in
their power to ensure their dominion and maintain their control." (emphasis omitted)); see




employer's conscious motive is to run its business in the most efficient
manner, the employer likely will be able to make a strong case that
its business requires the use of the offending practices.
Both statistical and unconscious discrimination therefore present
difficult problems because in each case the employers are attempting
to increase the efficiency of their businesses and thus will be able to
mount a strong defense of the reasonableness of their practices. If a
lenient standard of business necessity is applied, these employers will
mostly likely meet their burden of proving business necessity, and the
barriers to equal employment opportunity will remain.
Given this predicament, the only way to combat these forms of
discrimination effectively is to make it so difficult and costly to defend
practices with a disparate impact that employers will be convinced
either to abandon the practices or to make sure that they eliminate
the disparate impact by hiring sufficient numbers of the affected
groups. 339 Employers thus will be given a strong incentive to hire
individuals they would have otherwise rejected for ostensibly neutral
reasons. Only by changing employers' cost-benefit calculus in this
fashion may the pernicious effects of statistical and unconscious
discrimination be overcome.
The strict necessity standard accomplishes this goal of raising the
costs of maintaining practices with a disparate impact by requiring
employers who wish to defend their practices to do so by an expen-
sive means-scientific validation. For example, the cost of the most
favored form of validation, criterion validation, has been estimated to
be at least $100,000, an expense that has to be incurred each time a
practice is used for a particular job.3 Many employers, faced with
this enormous expense, would rather give in than fight. The strict
necessity standard, then, is a most effective tool for eliminating
practices with a disparate impact. Consequently, it is the best means
to ensure the removal of barriers to equal employment oppor-
tunity.
341
The strict necessity standard, however, should not be used if it
does not satisfy the other significant purpose of Title VII: protection
of the fundamental prerogatives of the employer. The Supreme Court
339. In fact, Justice Blackmun, in his influential concurring opinion in Weber, argued
that private employers should be allowed to engage in affirmative action, in part because
of the difficult position in which they were placed by the disparate impact cause of action.
United Steelworkers of America v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 209-11 (1979) (Blackmun, J.,
concurring).
340. Rutherglen, supra note 12, at 1317-18.
341. But see EPSTEiN, supra note 11, at 231-33.
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in Wards Cove recognized the heavy pressure that the strict necessity
standard places on employers either to abandon their practices or to
engage in affirmative action.342 The Court's determination to
prevent this financial coercion was a central motivation in its
restructuring of the disparate impact cause of action.343
Confining the strict necessity defense to non-complex jobs
alleviates this problem and protects employers' fundamental
prerogatives. Because the strict necessity standard will be applied
only to jobs for which scientific validation is possible, application of
the high standard does not deprive employers of their fundamental
prerogatives because it does not require employers to impose quotas.
Application of the strict necessity standard only to non-complex
jobs protects employer prerogatives in another way. One of the most
disturbing results of applying the strict necessity standard to practices
that cannot be validated is that many of the affected jobs are
managerial positions. Managers are the means by which an
enterprise's proprietor exercises rights of ownership; they are the
personal representatives of the owner at the workplace. Forcing
employers either to hire managers of whom they disapprove or to use
selection criteria that they consider insufficient invades the deepest
sphere of employer autonomy.3 "
The application of the strict necessity standard only to non-
complex jobs would exempt the requirements for managerial positions
from the strict standard in most instances. Without this exemption,
an owner of a small or medium-sized company would have two
unpalatable choices. On one hand, the employer could select a
manager without the benefit of subjective selection criteria, such as
interviews or relevant experience, that are the best means for
determining whether a particular person is worthy of the highest trust.
On the other hand, the employer could use the practices but eliminate
disparate impact by using hiring quotas. Either way, the employer
faces the real danger of hiring someone it does not fully trust.
Application of the more flexible standard of justification to manageri-
al positions, however, permits employers to use selection practices
with which they feel comfortable.
A final advantage of applying the strict necessity standard only
to non-complex jobs is that it places an upper boundary on any
342. Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 652, 659 (1989).
343. Id. at 652-53, 659-60; see supra notes 129-45 and accompanying text.
344. Earl M. Maltz, Title VII and Upper Level Employment-A Response to Professor
Bartholet, 77 Nw. U. L. REv. 776, 790-91 (1983).
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efficiency losses suffered by employers. The central assumption of
free-market economic theory is that employers are in a better position
to judge the efficiency of a particular practice than is the
government.345 The disparate impact cause of action, particularly if
accompanied by the strict necessity standard, significantly interferes
with employer discretion by giving employers a strong incentive to
abandon practices that they otherwise have judged efficient. The
effect of government interference would be to force employers to hire
less efficient employees than those they would have hired using other
practices.346
If the strict necessity standard is applied to jobs for which
validation of job-related practices is impossible, the prospect of
unlimited efficiency losses exists. Because the employer cannot prove
the necessity of its practice, it will be forced to abandon even valuable
practices.347 Moreover, large losses are even more likely when given
the fact that the positions for which practices cannot be validated are
precisely those kinds of complex positions in which good or bad
performance can greatly affect the business' profitability or even
survival.3" Without a different standard for complex jobs, employ-
ers would have no choice, other than the imposition of hiring quotas,
but to abandon their practices regarding these jobs, no matter their
value.
If, however, this powerful incentive to abandon efficient practices
is limited to jobs for which selection practices can be validated, the
efficiency costs have a natural limit. If the costs imposed by the
abandonment of a particular practice are more than the cost of
validating the practice, the employer can validate the practice 49
Thus, the most an employer can lose is the cost of validation.
345. Id. at 790.
346. Ld. at 787; EPSTEIN, supra note 11, at 212-16.
347. Alternatively, the employer could "choose" to implement hiring quotas. In this
context, however, the choice would be a requirement. If the existence of the business
depended on the use of the practice, the employer, having been deprived of any
opportunity to prove the need for the practice, would be forced to implement quotas. This
"offer you can't refuse" is contrary to Title VII's mandate to protect fundamental
employer prerogatives.
348. For discussion of the economics involved in these issues, see Armen A. Alchian
& Harold Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization, 62 AM.
ECON. REV. 777,783-85 (1972); Eugene F. Fama, Agency Problems and the Theory of the
Firm, 88 J. POL. ECON. 288, 290-92 (1980).
349. Of course it is quite possible that the employer will find that the costs of
validation, while perhaps less than the costs of abandoning the practice entirely, outweigh
the costs of combining the practice with racial quotas to eliminate the disparate impact.
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In sum, limiting the strict necessity standard to non-complex jobs
dismantles significant barriers to equal employment opportunity
without unduly burdening employers, as it neither deprives them of
their fundamental prerogatives or imposes unlimited costs on them.
2. The Need for a Different Standard for Complex Jobs
If some jobs exist for which neither job qualifications nor job
performance may be objectively measured, then the strict necessity
standard cannot apply to these jobs. If a practice cannot be validated,
an employer will be required either to abandon the practice, no
matter how valuable it is to its business, or to implement quotas. This
Hobson's Choice violates Title VII's command to protect the
fundamental prerogatives of the employer. Preventing the employer
from being placed in this dilemma would be a sufficient reason to
abandon the strict necessity test for these jobs.
There is, however, much more to be said in favor of applying a
more lenient standard of business necessity to complex jobs. A
business necessity standard for complex jobs modeled on the one
proposed in this Article would allow judges to strike the best balance
between the different purposes of Title VII.
This less strict form of the business necessity defense consists of
two steps. First, employers must prove that successful performance
of the job in question, because of the complex duties of the job,
requires the possession of unmeasurable qualities. Alternatively,
employers can prove that the position involves duties so complex that
performance on the job cannot be measured objectively. If employers
make this first showing, they must prove that the employment
practices they have implemented for the position significantly serve
their legitimate employment interests. Thus employers need not
scientifically validate such practices; instead, they can prove to the
court that their practices are a legitimate way to judge whether the
employee possesses the qualities or skills necessary to do the job.
Courts that have resisted allowing employers to meet a lesser
standard of justification for subjective practices have been concerned
that, if given more freedom to use these practices, employers will
attempt to insulate discriminatory practices from scrutiny.35° For
example, if subjective practices are immunized from disparate impact
attack, employers will simply change their systems to include a
350. See, e.g., Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 989-91 (1988); Green
v. USX Corp., 843 F.2d 1511, 1525 (3d Cir. 1988), cert. granted and vacated, 490 U.S. 1103
(1989); Griffin v. Carlin, 755 F.2d 1516, 1525 (11th Cir. 1985).
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subjective element such as an interview.35' They might be par-
ticularly tempted to include such an element in hiring practices for
jobs, such as entry-level positions, in which qualifications for the jobs
are difficult to define.352 This unaccountable discretion opens the
door to infection of the hiring process by both conscious and
unconscious biases.
The two-stage business necessity standard for complex jobs,
unlike the exemption of subjective practices from disparate impact
analysis, does not provide employers an opening to discriminate.
First, employers cannot simply choose to use subjective practices to
gain the benefit of the more lenient standard of justification. They
must prove that the job at issue requires the kinds of skills or tasks
for which objective measures of performance cannot be designed. It
is insufficient to say that the job sometimes requires the exercise of
discretion or tact, as almost any job requires these qualities at some
time. Rather, the employer, must prove that the essence of the job
requires the exercise of these intangible qualities. Only when this
burden of proof is met will employers be afforded the lesser standard
of justification.353 If an employer fails to prove its need to use
351. In one representative case, Green v. USX Corp., the employer's hiring process for
laborers relied primarily on interviews with both a personnel officer and the foreman of
the department in which the prospective laborer would work. 843 F.2d at 1516. The
interviewing foreman was given absolute discretion to hire or reject the applicant. I&
Neither of the interviewers was given any instructions regarding the evaluation of
candidates, and the trial court found that the interviewers made wholly subjective
evaluations regarding the applicants' satisfaction of the hiring criteria. Id at 1516-17. The
court rejected the employer's attempt to argue that all subjective hiring practices should
be insulated from disparate impact analysis. Id at 1525. The court concluded that
excluding subjective hiring criteria from disparate impact analysis would encourage
employers to use these selection practices in order to avoid validating their practices. Id.
If unsupervised by courts, subjective hiring practices such as interviews allow "unarticulat-
ed biases or unconscious prejudices" to infect the hiring process. kd The court decided
that employers should defend their subjective hiring practices just as they should defend
their objective practices. Id.
Justice Blackmun's opinion in Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977
(1988), also addressed this problem. Employers, Justice Blackmun warned, should not be
able "to escape liability simply by articulating vague, inoffensive-sounding subjective
criteria .... Such a rule would encourage employers to abandon attempts to construct
selection mechanisms subject to neutral application for the shelter of vague generalities."
Id. at 1009-10 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
352. The use of subjective practices for hiring laborers, for example, as was the case in
Green, would allow employers to select employees they like without justifying their
choices.
353. Thus, an employer could not add a subjective element to the hiring process, as the
defendant attempted in the Green case, for jobs which by nature do not require the use
of these practices in order to maximize its discretion in making employment decisions.
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practices that cannot be validated, the practices will be subjected to
the strict necessity test, a standard that employers cannot meet if the
practices cannot be scientifically validated. :'
Second, even if an employer could show that the position in
question qualified for the more lenient standard of justification, it
would not be assured of meeting its burden of proving business
necessity. The employer would still have to show that the practice
significantly serves its legitimate employment interests. This standard
does not give carte blanche to employers to implement any practices
they choose; rather, it instructs courts to be flexible in what practices
they find justified and in the kinds of proof they will accept to justify
these practices 5
354. One possible criticism of requiring proof that the nature of a particular job
requires a standard of business necessity is that it adds a complicating stage to disparate
impact litigation. In fact, this two-stage standard of business necessity for complex jobs
will be easier for courts to administer effectively than applying the strict necessity standard
to all jobs.
Assuming that an employer decided to go through the trouble of using practices that
are difficult to evaluate objectively, the strict necessity standard asks courts to answer the
social science question of whether the proposed form of validation meets scientific
standards. See Bartholet, supra note 50, at 986-89. Whether the job at issue is the kind
that requires a more flexible standard of justification, however, is one far more suited for
legal adjudication than is the question of whether a particular form of validation is
scientifically acceptable. Judges are far more capable of answering the common sense
question of whether a job requires complex skills or the performance of complex tasks
than they are of judging the current state of industrial psychology.
355. For example, if an employer wants to use an objective ability test as an
employment qualification, a court may require more objective proof of the test's job-
relatedness than it would for a more subjective practice. After all, the employer, by using
an objective test, has said that some qualifications for the job can be quantified. The court
would be justified in making the employer present more scientific proof that the test
substantially relates to the job.
Where, however, the employer wishes to impose a requirement that a reasonable
person might expect to ensure the hiring of more effective employees, but would be
difficult to justify empirically, a court may accept less objective forms of evidence. For
example, the court could base its acceptance of the employer's proffered justification on
expert testimony explaining how the practice in question significantly serves the employer's
legitimate employment interests. The Fifth Circuit in Davis relied, in part, on this kind of
evidence in finding that the employer demonstrated that a college credit hours requirement
for police officers was sufficiently job-related or necessary. Davis v. City of Dallas, 777
F.2d 205, 222-23 (5th Cir. 1985). A court therefore should use its own judgment in
deciding whether the employer has proven a sufficient connection between its practice and
its legitimate employment interests. The court must seek to promote equal employment
opportunity while giving due deference to the special role that the employer's subjective
judgment must play in selecting employees for complex jobs.
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The concrete advantages of such a flexible approach are
obvious. 56  Keeping in mind that some departure from the strict
necessity rule is required for complex jobs in order to protect the
fundamental prerogatives of the employer, the flexible standard of
business necessity ensures that these prerogatives will be secured by
giving more leeway to employers to implement subjective employment
practices, education requirements, and other practices that cannot be
validated. Placing more discretion in the hands of employers will
allow the people who are in the best position to make economic
decisions to implement the practices that they believe will increase the
efficiency of the business.357 If given the discretion to use subjective
practices, for example, an employer will identify those potential
managers who possess the intangible qualities that will motivate other
employees to work harder. Without such discretion, these large
efficiency gains will be squandered.
In addition to making efficiency gains possible, the flexible
standard will prevent large efficiency losses. If an employer is forced
to select managers or other key employees through a hiring process
that the employer does not trust, the rational employer will closely
monitor these employees to make sure that they are performing
satisfactorily.5 8 This monitoring could be very costly and provides
no real benefit to the employer. The employer would most likely not
choose to incur such a cost if it were permitted to use a hiring process
it trusts.
356. The need for more flexibility than is afforded by the strict necessity standard has
been recognized even by judges arguing for the application of the strict standard. Justice
Blackmun's opinion in Watson illustrates this point. Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust,
487 U.S. 977, 1007-08 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
In arguing for adherence to the previous business necessity rules articulated by the Court,
Justice Blackmun argued that:
The proper means of establishing business necessity will vary with the type and
size of the business in question, as well as the particular job for which the
selection process is employed .... The fact that job-relatedness cannot always be
established with mathematical certainty does not free an employer from its
burden of proof, but rather requires a trial court to look to different forms of
evidence to assess an employer's claim of business necessity.
Id. (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). Indeed, in making
this argument, Justice Blackmun cited with approval Davis v. City of Dallas, 777 F.2d 205
(5th Cir. 1985), cert denied, 476 U.S. 1116 (1986) and Zahorik v. Cornell Univ., 729 F.2d
85 (2d Cir. 1984), which explicitly applied a lesser standard of justification to particular
kinds of jobs. Watson, 487 U.S. at 1007-08 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment).
357. EPSTEIN, supra note 11, at 231-32.
358. Maltz, supra note 344, at 788-89.
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A final advantage of the flexible standard is that by providing
courts with an opportunity to make allowances for the special nature
of complex jobs, courts will be dissuaded from inappropriately
weakening other parts of the disparate impact cause of action to
protect the fundamental prerogatives of employers?59 Examples of
this mistaken weakening are the cases that exclude subjective practice
from disparate impact analysis entirely. Other courts have made it
more difficult for disparate impact plaintiffs to establish their prima
facie case by rigorously scrutinizing the statistical evidence submitted
in support of that case.3"
Excessive scrutiny of the plaintiff's prima facie case defeats the
purpose of the disparate impact cause of action, which is designed to
test employers' need for practices that disproportionately exclude
particular groups. If a plaintiff cannot pass the prima facie stage of
the litigation, employment practices that may constitute barriers to
equal employment opportunity will not be tested by any business
necessity standard. The purpose of ensuring equal employment
opportunity will be better served if courts are encouraged to protect
the legitimate interests of employers by articulating a practical
business necessity defense rather than by manipulating the prima facie
case. The recognition that some kinds of jobs require a more flexible
business necessity defense will enable courts to best serve the
different purposes of Title VII.
D. Criticisms and Response
1. The Continuing Problem of Subtle Discrimination
One possible objection to the two-tier standard outlined above
is that reducing the burden of justification for complex jobs may open
the door for the operation of cleverly concealed or unconscious
biases. This licensing of subtle discrimination creates a "glass ceiling,"
preventing the elevation of historically disadvantaged groups to the
very kinds of important jobs that members of disadvantaged groups
need to fill in order to create a more just society.361 The initial
359. See Rutherglen, supra note 12, at 1343 ("A strict insistence on highly technical
standards of validation only perpetuates the tendency of courts to avoid placing such a
heavy burden of justification upon defendants in the first place.").
360. For example, a court could find that a plaintiff has not identified the correct
geographical labor market or has not drawn a comparison with the correct pool of
potential employees. See, e.g., EEOC v. Chicago Miniature Lamp Works, 947 F.2d 292,
299-300 (7th Cir. 1991).
361. See Bartholet, supra note 50, at 955-59.
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force of this argument, which is the analogue to the argument in favor
of the strict necessity standard, is undeniable; certainly, if it is easier
for employers to establish business necessity, there will be some
instances in which the concealed or unconscious bias cannot be
reached.
Critics of the two-tier standard may argue that a flexible standard
of business necessity also gives freer rein to the concealed or
unconscious biases of judges to exclude historically disadvantaged
groups from positions of power.362 After all, as Elizabeth Bartholet
argues, judges are drawn from the same social strata as the employers
whose decisions they are reviewing; this familiarity with the dilemmas
faced by their social and economic peers may make them hesitant to
interfere with the practices of these employers. 3 This objection is
plausible, for if judges are given more discretion to decide whether a
defendant has established business necessity, a greater possibility
exists that judges will render mistaken or biased decisions than if the
judges are required to apply a more objective standard.
These objections could be rebutted by showing that increased
employer and judicial discretion is necessary to prevent the mandated
use of quotas.3 64 if averting the deprivation of employers' fun-
damental prerogatives results in a failure to reach some cases of
subtle discrimination, we must be satisfied with the knowledge that
courts have to be as faithful to Title VII's mandate to protect
employer prerogatives as they are to its command to eliminate both
discrimination and arbitrary barriers to equal employment oppor-
tunity.
365
These objections can also be answered by demonstrating that in
allegations of discrimination involving complex jobs, the demands of
the disparate impact model may be relaxed because the disparate
treatment model will reach much of the discrimination involving these
jobs. Disparate treatment causes of action are especially effective in
this context because decisions regarding complex jobs generally
implicate few jobs and few applicants. For example, in the average
362. See iL at 978-80.
363. Id
364. See supra notes 280-91 and accompanying text.
365. In the pre-Act debate regarding the correct interpretation of Title VII, Elizabeth
Bartholet argued that careful attention to the 1972 amendments to Title VII demonstrates
that Congress opposed the creation of a two-tier standard of business necessity. Bartholet,
supra note 50, at 980-83. Whatever the merits of Bartholet's argument, however, any
present definition of the standard of business necessity must start with the Act, which
establishes a two-tier standard of necessity.
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workplace, there are fewer managerial positions than entry-level ones.
Applicants for managerial positions usually are the few individuals
who are qualified for a job with complex duties. Thus the hiring or
promotion decision for this kind of job most often requires employers
to make a direct and personal comparison between particular
individuals.
In the managerial context, therefore, it is likely that the employer
will be, or should be, able to articulate specific reasons why it decided
to hire or promote one person over another. Thus, by refuting the
specific grounds for the decision, plaintiffs can show, more easily than
in a case involving general policies for the hiring of many workers,
that the employer's articulated rationale is either a pretext for
discrimination or is so irrational that the only possible motive for the
employer's actions is discrimination.3" Courts can police these
kinds of employment decisions far more easily than they can police
the institution of general hiring practices for entry-level workers.367
Even assuming, however, that the disparate treatment cause of
action is incapable of reaching some forms of subtle discrimination,
the disparate impact cause of action codified by the Act, even when
coupled with a more flexible definition of business necessity, still will
reach most cases of subtle discrimination. The most important
366. See Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252-58 (1981).
Plaintiffs may also bring a class-based disparate treatment claim. A class of plaintiffs can
prove that an employer has engaged in a practice or pattern of discrimination by
demonstrating, through statistical evidence in combination with proof of specific instances
of discrimination, that discrimination is the employer's "standing operating procedure."
International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 334-41 (1977).
367. One can better understand why the disparate treatment cause of action is the more
appropriate and effective approach in discrimination cases involving complex jobs by
looking at the facts of Watson. In that case, a female African-American, after over six
years on the job as a proof operator and teller at a bank, applied four times for promotion
to separate managerial positions. Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 982
(1988). Each time, she was turned down in favor of a white employee. Id. In her
disparate impact claim, Watson challenged the subjective system used to select managers.
See supra notes 94-128 and accompanying text. The real problem in this case, if there was
one, however, was not the subjective system itself, since deciding who will be the best
manager always requires subjective judgment. The potential problem was in how the
subjective system was used. In each of the four employment decisions, Watson was
personally rejected in favor of a particular white person. Id. In her disparate treatment
cause of action, however, Watson was given the opportunity to demonstrate that the
employer's reasons for preferring specific individuals to her were false and were a pretext
for discrimination. Ia at 984. Her failure to prove that the employer's reasons for
promoting others over her were discriminatory is persuasive evidence that the employer
acted legitimately. Id. at 984. It is difficult to conceive how Watson could have been




component of the Act for fighting subtle discrimination is not any
particular definition of business necessity; rather, it is the requirement
that, if the plaintiff demonstrates that a practice has a disparate
impact, the employer must bear the burden of proving that its
practices are necessary."
Making the business necessity justification an affirmative defense,
rather than a Wards Cove-type burden of production, requires courts
both to make employers show exactly why the need for their practices
outweighs the harm to the plaintiffs and to make independent
judgments about these rationales. Practices produced by concealed
or unconscious bias are much more likely to fail if an employer must
affirmatively justify them, and if a disinterested arbiter scrutinizes
them.369 If the employer cannot prove that its practices meet the
standard of necessity, the court must rule for the plaintiffs.
In addition to imposing the burden of proof on employers, the
Act provides plaintiffs with another way to demonstrate that the
practice at issue is unnecessary, despite the strength of any proffered
justification. The plaintiff will prevail if he or she can show that there
is an alternate employment practice that will meet the employer's
goals but eliminate the disparate impact."0 This opportunity to
refute the employer's explanation provides another method to identify
and eliminate subtle discrimination.
Thus, consistent with the Act, each level of the two-tier business
necessity standard requires both that the employer affirmatively prove
the necessity of its practices and that the plaintiff be given the
opportunity to show alternative employment practices that will
accomplish the employer's goals without producing a disparate
impact.371 Even though it is possible that the application of a more
368. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(a)(i) (1995).
369. Bartholet, supra note 50, at 1004 ("The difference between these burdens on the
employer will often be the difference between winning and losing.").
370. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(a)(ii).
371. Placing the burden of persuasion on the employer contrasts sharply with the Wards
Cove conception of the disparate impact cause of action, which was based on the disparate
treatment model. See supra notes 129-45 and accompanying text. As Justice O'Connor
explained in Watson, the premise underlying the modeling of the disparate impact cause
of action on the disparate treatment action was the elimination of practices that amount
to intentional discrimination.
The distinguishing features of the factual issues that typically dominate in
disparate impact cases do not imply that the ultimate legal issue is different than
in cases where disparate treatment analysis is used .... [T]he necessary premise
of the disparate impact approach is that some employment practices, adopted
without a deliberately discriminatory motive, may in operation be functionally
equivalent to intentional discrimination.
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flexible standard of business necessity to some jobs will mean that
some subtle discrimination will go undetected, the Act's rejection of
the Wards Cove structure of the cause of action and its imposition of
the burden of persuasion on the employer will reach most
discrimination, no matter how subtle. By forcing employers to
undergo a close scrutiny of their practices at both levels of the two-
tier inquiry, courts will possess sufficient tools to ensure a workplace
free of arbitrary barriers to equal opportunity.
2. The Case Against the Sliding Scale Approach
Commentators who have criticized a rigid, strict approach to the
problem of business necessity also have suggested that, rather than
adjusting the required level of justification to the difficulty of the job
at issue, courts should tie the rigor of the business necessity standard
to the strength of the proof of disparate impact presented by the
plaintiff."3 For instance, if the plaintiff demonstrates that the
employer's practices disqualify almost all applicants of a particular
group, the employer would have to meet a strict necessity standard in
order to justify its practices. 73 If, on the other hand, the employer's
practices only have a mildly disproportionate impact on the job
opportunities of the group in question, then a more lenient standard
of business necessity would apply.74
These commentators argue that if one understands the disparate
impact cause of action as a tool for eliminating concealed
discrimination, the level of disparate impact caused by the challenged
practice is a good measure of the probability that the practice is
founded on discrimination. 75 Since a practice that causes a large
disparate impact is more likely to be rooted in discrimination than
one that causes a smaller impact, courts should presume that the most
harmful practice is invalid and impose the strict burden of justification
Watson, 487 U.S. at 987.
Neither the plurality in Watson nor the Court in Wards Cove discussed the necessity
of preventing subtle discrimination such as statistical or unconscious discrimination. See
id. at 977. It is not surprising that they did not do so; requiring the plaintiff to persuade
the court that the employer's proffered justifications are illegitimate makes it likely that
the plaintiff will only prevail when the employer's justifications are so weak that the
practices amount to intentional discrimination. More subtle forms of discrimination cannot
be reached without a more searching inquiry into the employer's justifications.
372. See Player, supra note 43, at 4, 36-44; Rutherglen, supra note 12, at 1320.
373. Player, supra note 43, at 42.
374. Id
375. See Rutherglen, supra note 12, at 1323.
1554 [Vol. 74
DISPARATE IMPACT
on employers.376 In contrast, courts should be more flexible in
evaluating employers' justifications for practices that have a lesser
disparate impact.
377
The problem with this approach is that it misapprehends the
reason why a rigid, strict necessity standard is unworkable. It is not
unworkable because it is unfair or impractical to require scientific
validation when there is a small disparate impact; it fails because it
requires scientific validation when such validation is impossible. Even
if, for example, an employer's subjective hiring process for managers
results in the near-total exclusion of African-Americans or women, a
faithful interpretation of Title VII and the Act does not permit courts
to apply the strict necessity standard because it is impossible for an
employer to defend subjective practices through scientific validation.
The employer would either have to abandon its practices or use
quotas, a dilemma which may not be imposed under Title VII.
Instead, the court should apply the more flexible standard of business
necessity, which requires the employer to prove that the job in
question requires the use of subjective practices and that the practices
significantly serve its legitimate interests.378
376. Id at 1324.
377. Player, supra note 43, at 42; Rutherglen, supra note 12, at 1324.
378. One commentator has suggested that the Act's definition of business necessity
should be interpreted as a mandate for courts to scrutinize the efficiency of employer
practices. Greenberger, supra note 11, at 308. Founding his argument on the premise that
employers frequently use practices that are both inefficient and have a disparate impact,
Greenberger argues that courts should strike down practices with a disparate impact that
do not accurately measure merit and thus do not contribute to productivity. Id. at 307-08.
This approach is unworkable because it is based on two false premises. First,
Greenberger misstates the concept of economic efficiency or, as he calls it, productivity.
He argues that the sole measure of whether a practice is efficient is whether it effectively
measures merit. See id. at 306 ("As embodied in Title VII, impact doctrine serves
primarily as an injunction to employers to assess the abilities of their employees
accurately.").
This definition of efficiency is at best incomplete. The most efficient practice for the
employer is the one that most effectively evaluates the merit of potential or present
employees at the cheapest cost. Thus, while a practice other than the one used by the
employer may measure merit more effectively, it may be more efficient for the employer
to maintain its practice because the mistakes made using the current practice may be less
costly than implementing a new one. A court that is directed to impose the most efficient
practice must allow employers to retain practices that both are not the most accurate
measures of ability and have a disparate impact. It is doubtful that Greenberger has this
result in mind when he calls for a productivity-based approach.
Second, Greenberger mistakenly asserts that Title VII does not require that employers
suffer productivity losses in order to eliminate practices that serve as barriers to equal
employment opportunity. See id. at 308 ("Efficient practices need never be abandoned,
even if they exclude minorities completely.") (emphasis omitted). On the contrary, one
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Conversely, even if the employer's practices only have a mild
disparate impact, Title VII, as amended by the Act, does not instruct
courts to ignore this potential barrier to equal opportunity. Rather,
the judiciary's mandate is to eliminate all arbitrary barriers to equal
employment opportunity, and if an employer's practice is one
amenable to scientific validation, then the employer should have to
provide that level of proof in order to justify its practice. After all,
while the good achieved by attacking an isolated practice with a mild
impact may seem negligible, the cumulative effect of eliminating such
practices may have a great effect on the promotion of equal
employment opportunity.
CONCLUSION
The inherent ambiguity of language and the problem of at-
tributing a single intent to a group of disparate individuals makes the
task of statutory interpretation a difficult one, particularly when
different factions of the legislature and the executive cannot agree on
the correct legal rule and instead write a hopelessly ambiguous
statute, leaving all parties with the hope that the courts will give the
statute their favored interpretation. Certainly, one can see the
business necessity provisions of the Act as the paradigmatic example
of this phenomenon.
Those who support the return to a Griggs standard are confident
that the courts will impose a uniform strict necessity standard. This
outcome is unlikely, not only because a close reading of the Act and
a thorough understanding of the circumstances of its enactment reveal
that the statute does not enact the Griggs standard. More fundamen-
tally, an absolute strict standard is unworkable. The serious issues
regarding qualifications for supervisors, professionals, and other
complex jobs will resurface, and the passage of the Act will not make
the professional, often intangible, qualities desired for these positions
any more amenable to the objective analyses called for by the strict
job-relatedness test. Even if the courts intend at first to apply the
strict necessity test, it will be only a matter of time before they will
again be forced to address the impossibility of applying the strict
of the main premises of disparate impact theory is that the most effective way to eliminate
subtle discrimination is to make justifying practices with a disparate impact so costly that
the employer will closely examine its need for the practices. This theory relies on and
approves of the fact that an employer will choose to suffer some productivity losses to
avoid the higher costs of justification. See supra notes 328-41 and accompanying text.
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standard to employment practices used in connection with complex
jobs.
It is also unlikely that the courts will interpret the Act's business
necessity provisions as having incorporated the Wards Cove standard.
Even if the majority of the Supreme Court believes that the Wards
Cove approach was correct, it cannot legitimately ignore the fact that
the majority of the Congress that enacted the Act found this new
approach unacceptable. Unless the Court is willing to defy the known
intent of Congress, it must interpret the Act as establishing a business
necessity standard that is stricter than Wards Cove.
Despite the intent of all the parties responsible for the Act to
write a statute that courts might possibly interpret in their favor, the
Act does in fact provide the judiciary a workable definition of
business necessity quite different from that offered by either extreme
in the debate. By instructing courts to interpret business necessity in
the same way that the Court interpreted it before Wards Cove, the
Act turns our attention to the Court's struggle to apply one standard
of business necessity to diverse jobs. By examining how the Court
confronted the particular problems raised by the practices used for
particular jobs, one discovers that before Wards Cove the Court did
not apply one unbending standard to business necessity in all cases.
Instead, it adjusted the standard to the job. Taking the search a step
further, one finds that many lower federal courts applied the same
flexible standard and were much more willing to do so openly. In
studying all these cases, we find that the courts in essence applied
different standards to jobs based on their complexity.
This two-tier standard, in which courts apply a strict standard to
non-complex jobs and a more flexible one to complex jobs, is not only
the best answer to the question of what the Act established. It also
serves the vital purposes of Title VII. By applying a strict standard
to non-complex jobs, it sweeps away both cleverly concealed
discrimination and the barriers to equal employment opportunity
resulting from unintended, and even unconscious, discrimination.
These gains, however, are not made at the cost of depriving the
employer of its fundamental prerogatives. By ensuring that an
employer has a fair opportunity to defend any of its practices, we can
be sure that we do not purchase more equal employment opportunity
at the price of either forcing employers to abandon legitimate
practices or mandating quotas. After all, what does it profit us to
remove barriers to employers when, by requiring employers either to
abandon practices they legitimately need to run their business or to
engage in pure discrimination, we lose the soul of Title VII?
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